The Existence and Nature of Predicamental Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez by Montague, Michael Joseph
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1948
The Existence and Nature of Predicamental
Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez
Michael Joseph Montague
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1948 Michael Joseph Montague
Recommended Citation
Montague, Michael Joseph, "The Existence and Nature of Predicamental Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez" (1948).
Master's Theses. Paper 785.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/785
p ------------------------------------------------. 
D 
THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS SUAREZ 
BY 
MICHAEL J. MONTAGUE, S.J., A.B. 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER 
, OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY 
AUGUST 
1948 
-CHAPTER 
I. 
II. 
• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION. • • • • • • • • • • • 
Importance of the question---Purpose of the 
thesis--~Scope of the thesia---Method of the 
thesis---Plan of the theaia-~-Historical truth 
-M-On~ological truth. 
THE EXISTENCE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS • 
The fact of relations---Place in Aristotle's 
categories-R~Real and rational relations--~ 
Genuine and attributive relations---Tran-
Bcendental and predicamental relations-~~His­
tory of the question---Plato---Aristotle---
Boethius---Gilbert de la Porree--"St. Thomas 
---Henry of Ghent---Suarez's position---Rela-
tions in the Trinity---Language demands real 
relations---Order in the universe---Irreduci-
ble to any absolute predicament---Inexplica-
ble by any mere extrinsic denomination. 
PAGE 
• 1 
• 4 
III. THE NATURE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS. e • 44 
Definition of predicamental relation---Analy-
sis of definition---Difficulties arising from 
definition---Elements pertinent to relation-
-wCauses of a relation---Subject of a relation 
---Number of subjects---Foundation of a rela-
tion---Necessity of foundation---Distinction 
of foundation from subject---Di~tinction of 
foundation from relation---Position of adver-
saries---Teaching of Suarez on this point---
Answers to objections---Foundation and the ra-
tio fundandi---Term of a relation---Actuality 
or-tfie term---Term as of essence of relation 
---Absolute necessity of term---Distinction 
between relation and term---Is the term abso-
lute or relative?---Kinds of predicamental 
relations---Relations based on number or ~ul­
tiplicity---Relations based on active or pas-
sive potencies---Relations based on measure. 
-CHAPTER .. PAGE 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON RELATIONS. • .98 
Necessity of problem in context---Method 
of approach---Summary of problem---Rela-
tion as an accident---Essence of relation 
---Position of Billot and Kossel---Rela-
tion an analogous term---Distinction of 
relation from foundation---Proofs---Exis-
tence of predicamental relation---Conse-
quences of opposite vieww--Analysis of 
Suarez's connotation of term---Basis of 
his stand: essence and existence---Suarez's 
concept of being---Analysis---Justifica~ 
tion of real distinction of relation and 
foundation---Answers to objections---Con-
clusion. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • o • • • .. • • • o • • o • 120 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
In a discussion of any doctrine so radical in a metaphysics 
and so far-reaching in its ontological implications as that of 
predicamental relations, it is necessary at the outset to deter-
mine once and for all onets precise purpose and scope, method 
and attack, and the limits one places on the treatment of the 
subject. 
A subject so vast could well become a mere superficial 
scaling of texts and shuffling of cliches torn from the pages of 
secondary sources and forced into some kind of extrinsic unity 
by reading into the opinions and conclusions of a philosopher 
the point one would like to find there and to establish. Such 
a work is foreign to everything that is philosophical and his-
torical. 
In this thesis we shall treat of relations, but not all reM 
lations. We shall try to focus on those relations which are 
known'as "predicamental relations." But even this is too broad. 
We shall try to interpret and rethink the fundamental problems 
arising from predicamental relations precisely as these relation 
were conceived and understood by Francis Suarez, the theologian-
philosopher, whom tradition has called the "Doctor Ex1,mius." 
1 
2 
But no doctrine in philosophy can be taken in complete iso-
• 
lation, cut off from its tie-up with everything else the philo-
sopher understood, or from the historical development of that 
doctrine through the linkage of the writings of the philosophers 
through the ages. But the historical treatment in this thesis 
can, and will, be only incidental. We are not interested pri-
marily in the concept of relation as it grew from the time it 
was first explicitly presented to the philosophic world by Plato 
to the time of Suarez. We are not primarily interested in show-
ing in all its manifold details the internal influence of the 
Suarezian position on predicamental relations on the other meta~ 
physical and theological tenets of Suarez. Our pr~ncipal task 
will be to examine in detail Suarez's position on predicamental 
relations, their existence and their nature, the elements of a 
predicamental relation, and the various kinds of predicamental 
relations; then, we shall subject the initial bases of that 
doctrine to metaphysical analysis in order to determine the 
validity of Suarez's stand and the value of his arguments. 
In the course of the exposition we shall have to treat in 
passing some of the opinions of Suarez's predecessors on this 
very question, but we shall do so only in so far as they in some 
way contributed, either positively or negatively, to Suarez's 
own stand, rather than for any merit or demerits they might pos-
sess in themselves. 
With this as our aim and our scope we can briefly take note 
3 
of the procedure and method we shall employ in the following 
.. 
pages. Our key source will be the forty-seventh disputation of 
suarez's Disputationes Metaphysicae. 1 The greater part of the 
material considered in the purely expository chapters of the 
thesis will be taken directly from this source. The necessary 
background, principally historical, will be culled from leads 
in Suarez himself, traced through such books as Migne's Patro-
logia Latina, DeWulf, Ueberweg, and others that will be mention~ 
ed in the text or footnotes throughout the paper. 
The thesis itself conveniently divides itself into two 
parts: the quest for Suarez's exact understanding of the exis-
tence and nature of predicamental relations. Here we will be 
primarily concerned with historical truth, establishing what 
Suarez actually held in regard to the fourth predicament. Se-
condly, we shall undertake a critique of Suarez's position in 
the light of metaphysical principles. These will be proved only 
in passing and in so much as they enter immediately i.nto the 
question at issue. This chapter will view the ontological truth 
of Suarez's stand. 
With this as a prelude, let us turn to our task, and watch 
Francis Suarez attempt to unravel the problem of predicamental 
relations. 
1 Franciscus Suarez, Opera Omnia, L. Vives, Par1siis, 1856 ... 
1877. 26 vols. Disputationes Metaphysicae, vols. 25-26. 
CHAPTER II 
TEE EXISTENCE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS 
If there is on thing that strikes us more soundly than any-
thing else when we turn our philosophic eyes on the reality 
about us of which we are a part, it is its relational nature. 
Reality 1s not merely a reality of static absolutes. It is dy-
namic, and this radical dynami sm shines forth in its ·every as-
pect. We are affecting things and things are affecting us. 
Everything is in some way similar to every other being and yet 
In some way different and distinct from everything else. It is 
a reality where every being is struggling to immortalize itself 
by reproducing itself continually, by stamping its own personal-
ity on all with which it c~mes in contact. It is a reality in 
which efficient and final causality are the main motif. Things 
are changing us, and we become dependent upon things in our 
knowledge, our volition, in our entire physical and psychic 
make-up. 
It is a growing reality, an evolving process, which yet in 
some way is bound together by a thin thread of unity and synthe-
sis. It is a reality where relations are obvious and absolutes 
need justification. Plato spent half his life and all his mind 
in trying to prove that there are absolutes beneath the pheno* 
menal relative, only to turn in his last days to find that he 
4 
5 
had destroyed even the possibility of explaining the dynamic 
relati vism he had taken for gran'ted. 1 
But even though the relational aspect of reality is obvious 
yet when a philosopher tries to dissect it metaphysically, he 
finds that it has difficulties all its own. Francis Suarez was 
not blind to any of these difficulties. 
Before Suarez set out to discover the causes of the patent 
relativity of things, he stood back for a moment and took a 
backward glance over the thoughts of the men who had Pl'6C eded 
him. 
Aristotle brought the whole question of relations to a head 
when in the fourth chapter of his Categories he wrote: 
Expressions which are in no way com-
posite signify substance, quantity, 
quality, relation, place, time'2Posi-
tion, state, action or affect. 
Note the first words of this quotation: "Expressions which are 
in no way composite ••• " It would seem that Aristotle derives 
the categories from our speech and the various and diverse ways 
we can speak of things, rather than from an analysis of exist" 
1 Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, transl. 'by D. J. 
Allan, Clarendon Press, Oxford,-r940, xxviii-xxix. Also cf., 
Sir James George Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, 
Macmillan and Co., London-;-I"930, 94 ... Dio. 
a Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, 
New York, 1941. The Categories, trans1. by E. M. Edghill, 
I b 2.6. 
6 
ing reality as suoh. 3 There are ten different ways of talking 
• 
about things; but this is not to say that there are neoessarily 
ten different modes of real being, at least, in the sense that 
eaoh oategory outs off and tags some partioular being or prinw 
ciple of being in the real order. 
Almost all the philosophers from Aristotle up to the time 
of Suarez himself freely admitted the ten categories or predioa" 
ments: ten ways of predicating. There was not, however, the 
same unanimity on the question whether there are ten real beings 
or kinds of being, each really distinct from every other being 
or prinoiple, to correspond to the ten-fold division of the 
predicaments. It is true that our speeoh and our words are 
signs of things -~ signa sup~ositiva rerum -- and that the modes 
of predioation are proportionate to the modes of being, 4 but 
many philosophers have interpreted this to mean that the being 
may either be in reality or in the mind. 5 Thus the mere faot 
that there are ten oategories or predicaments is not neoessarily 
indication or proof that there are ten beings in reality, or 
that when a philosopher admits the categories, he, by that very 
faot, intends to commit himself to ten different really distinot 
kinds of being existing as such in reality. 
3 
4 
5 
George Grote, Aristotle, John Murray, London, 1872, I, 83. 
Sister M. Marine Scheu, The Catiiories of Being in Aristotle 
and st. Thomas, Cath. Un!V7 of ere Press, WashIngton, 1944, 3:--
s. Thomae Aquinatis Commentarium in Aristotelis Libros Phfsi-
corum, in opeIt Omnia, Typls P. FIiocadori, Parmae, 1852- 873. 
Vol. XVIII, L er fII, leota 5, n. 15. 
This will be olear when we make our historioal survel. 
7 
So when Suarez approaches the problem of the predicaments 
and of predicamental relations in particular, he cannot merely 
fall back on the evident fact that we do talk about things in 
this way. He must determine in some other way whether there is 
a reality, a relative reality, which corresponds to our words 
. 
and ideas which are relative, in the form of a distinct prlnci w 
ple of real being. 
But at the outset, at least, this much can be said: if 
the ten predicaments do not of necessity demand ten real beings 
or kinds of being really distinct from one another, it is equal-
ly true that if there are only ten ways of speaking of real 
things, then anything that is real about these things, must fall 
within the ambit of these ten predicaments. 6 If things are 
really quantified, then that which renders them quantified must 
fall under the predicaments, omitting for the moment all con-
sideration of the precise nature of that quantity. The same 
is true of relation. If things are really relative, that in 
virtue of which they are relative must be included in the pre-
dicaments, and under the predicament of relation. 
But Suarez first limits what he means to include in this 
fourth predicament, and what he intends to exclude. 
If the predicaments are ten ways of speaking of real beings 
then the predicament of relation will include only real rela-
6 Scheu, 7. 
a 
tiona. • 
Cum. ergo relationes ration1.s non sint 
entia reaIia, et consequenter nec vera 
entia, non possunt ad praedicamentum 
Ad aliquid, quod reale est, pertinere. 7 
suarez, who is always careful to take note of st. Thomas's stand 
on any point, says that some have thought that St. Thomas want w 
ed the predicament of relation to contain under it both real and 
rational relations and to be predicated of them univocally. For 
st. Thomas writes in his Summa, 
••• considerandum est quod solum in his 
quae dicuntur ad ali quid inveniuntur ali-
qua secundumarationem tantum, et non se-
cundum rem. 
For if relation were predicated of them equivocally or analogi-
cally, there would be no reason why relations alone of all the 
predicaments contain not only real beings, but also rationate 
beings. 
• •• nam si tantum esset sermo de denomina-
tione aequivoca vel analoga, non tantum 
in his quae sunt ad allquld, s.ed etiam in 
aliis generibus invenirentur aliqua secun-
dum rationem tantum, utgcaecitas in qualiM 
tate, et sic de aliis. 
Cajetan, 10 Capreolus, 11 and Ferrara 12 seem to agree with 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 3. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolo~ica, M. E. Marietti, Taurini, 
1937, I, q. 29, a. 1. cr. a so, I, q. 28, a. 2; I, q. 13, 
a. 7; Quodl., IX, a. 5; De Pot., q. 2, a. 5. 
Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. ~ ----
S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, iussu impensaque P.M.Leonis 
XIII edita, ex Typographia Polyglotta, Romae, 1888-1930. Vol. 
~Summa Theologica cum Cajetani commentariis, In I, 28, 1. 
Capreolus, In Summam TEeolo~icam, d. 33, q. 1. 
Aquinatis Opera omnia, T. X II, Summa Contra Gentiles cum co 
mentarils E'ranciscl de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, L. IV,-C: I47 
9 
They claim that the nature and properties of relations as 
• 
such can be applied equally to rational and real relations, for 
both can be said to be quorum totum ~ ~ ad aliud se habere. 
But Suarez denies that relations of reason are truly rela-
tions, and so they cannot be contained under the predicament of 
relation. 
• •• sicut ens rationis non est verum ens, 
sed fictum, sic relatio rationis non est 
vera relatio, sed ficta, vel quasi per 
intellectum. 13 
The ultimate reason for this must be referred back to Suarez's 
concept of being, 14 which does not include real and rationate 
beings, but only real beings. 15 If being as such cannot be 
predicated strictly of both real and ra~ionate beings, neither 
can the predicament of relation be predicated properly of ratio 
al relations, for the predicaments treat only of real being and 
are its ten divisions. 16 
So Suarez's conclusion is tlrat rational relations really do 
not fall under the predicament of relation, but are only con-
ceived as if they were relations, through some kind of analogy 
or proportion with real relations • 
13 Suarez, d. 
14 Ibid., d. 
15 IEId., d. 
16 IoId., d. 
17 IbId., n. 
••• relationes autem rationis non consti-
tui in reali praedicamento, sed per analo-
giam et proportionem ad veras relationes 
declarari ••• 17 
47, s. 3, n. 3. 
2. 
54, intr., n. 1. 
47, s. 3., n. 3. 
5. 
. , 
10 
suarez claims that this is in perfect agreement with the 
• 
teaching of st. Thomas who never intended that the concept of 
relation should be applied univocally to real and rational re-
lations. 
• •• numquam enim (S. Thomas) dixit aut 
relationem rationis esse univoce rela· 
tionem cum reali, aut esse ad aliud non 
esse aliquid reale in relatione reali. 18 
st. Thomas meant that the nature of a real relation was such 
that through some kind of similitude or proportion, relations of 
reason could be thought of as enjoying the formal notes of a re-
lation, since there is some fundament in reality for such a 
mental consideration. st. Thomas, according to Suarez, only 
said that the formal notion of relation, sc., ad aliquid, does 
not tie itself down to any particular kind of relation, whether 
it be predicamental or transcendental, but merely implies a 
reference to another. 19 Thus it is easy for the mind fo con-
ceive of rational relations, not because they are truly rela-
tions or have a true ~ ad, as in the case of real relation, 
but because they can be conceived after the manner of real rela-
tions. 
So Suarez in the last paragraph of his discussion of real 
and rational relations neatly sums up his position on this point 
Ad rationem autem illius sententiae faci-
le respondetur, negando propriam rationem 
vere reperiri in relatione rationis, quia 
18 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5. 
19 Ibid., but cf. also, S.T., I, q. 29, a. 1. 
in tali relatione nec est vera habitu-
do, nec verum esse ad aliquid, sed solum • 
apprehenditur ac si esset ad aliquid. 20 
11 
In the terminology common among philosophers in their disN 
cussions of relations are to be found the terms: relations se-
cundum dici and relations secundum esse. A relation secundum 
dici, which we shall translate an attributive relation, is a 
-------thing which is conceived or explained or spoken of after the 
manner of a relation, while in reality it really has no true re~ 
lationehip. A relation secundum~, which we shall translate 
as a genuine relation, is a true and real order to something 
else. 
• •• relatio autem secundum esse dicitur 
quae revera habet proprium esse cum ha-
bitudine ad aliud. 21 
Because of these definitions, some have equated attributive 
relations with rational relations, since both would be something 
which 1s really not relative, but only conceived as relative. 
But Suarez denies that attributive and rational relations 
are the same; for relations of reason are relations according 
to an existence proportioned to them, namely, a rational exis-
tence, while attributive relations do not enjoy any existence 
whatsoever. 
• •• nam relat10 rationis, eo modo quo 
est, censetur esse relat10 secundum 
esse sibi proport10natum, ut patet de 
20 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5. 
21 Ibid., n. 6. 
relatione generis et speciei ••• quia eo 
modo haec cogitantur, non solum ~~cun­
tur, sed etiam sunt ad aliquid. 
• 
12 
Nor are attributive relations limited merely to rational 
relations; they also can be applied to any real being whose 
existence is absolute, but which we explain and express in a 
relative manner • 
••• relatio secundum dici non limitatur 
ad relationem rationis, sed dic1tur de 
quacumque rea11 re, cujus esse sit ab-
solutum, et a nobis non nisi per modum 
habitudinis seu relationis relativae 
explicatur. 23 
For example, Suarez cites divine omnipotence as an attributive 
relation, not because of any rational relationship which we set 
up, but because we cannot conceive or talk about God's omnipo-
tence, except with something else concomitant to it to which 
God is said to have some kind of relationship. Though this man-
ner of speaking does imply a manner of conceiving the thing, yet 
that conceptual manner is not such that from it necessarily 
would result a rational relation. It is not a reflex concept or 
one had as a result of comparison. It is a direct concept of 
something ab801ut~, which we, because of our imperfect mode of 
cognition, must conceive after the manner of those things which 
we know to be relative. Thus, in attributive relations we do 
not impose any kind of relation on the thing, either real or raM 
2a Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 8. 
23 Ibid. 
13 
tiOnal , but the relative nature of the thing conceived :s en-
tirelY drawn from the knower himself, not from the thing known • 
••• in quo modo concipiendi non attribui-
tur ipsi objecto cognito habitudo ulla 
nec realis nec rationis, sed solum ex 
parte concipientis fit conceptus per quam-
dam imitationem et analog~im ad concep-
tus rerum respectivarum. 
We often conceive of spiritual things after the manner of 
the corporeal things around us. We do not intend to place any 
corporeity in the spiritual objects, but we must conceive of 
them in this way since this is the only manner our mind can 
grapple with something which is strictly beyond their proper 
range. The same is true of attributive relations: we conceive 
of something relatively after an analogy with things which we 
know as relative. 
Et sic interdum concipimus rem absolutam 
instar respectivae, et de illa ita loqui-
mur ac si respectivu esset, at ideo dici25 tur esse relativa secundum dici tantum. 
So it is clear that Suarez o_oes not mean to include attri-
butive relations.under the predicament of relation, for nothing 
receives a peculiar nature merely from the fact that we conceive 
of it or speak of it in a certain way. 
We have already seen that for a relation to fall under the 
predicament of relation it must be a real and genuine relation. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
14 
The next question in our attempt to restrict our subjec~ of 
predicamental relations is whether every real and genuine rela-
tion is also a predicamental relation. Suarez answers in the 
negative. He believes that there are some relations which are 
not restricted to anyone particular predicament, but essential-
ly pertain to various and almost all classes of being. 
Praeter has vero esse alias habitudi-
nes veras etiam et reales, essentiali-
ter pertinentes ad varis et fere ad 
omnia genera entium, quae pr06Pterea transcendentales dicuntur. 2 
These are called trs.nscendental rela ti ons ; they transcend any 
one predicament and weave in and out of all of them. Predica-
mental relations, however, as we shall see, enjoy a certain kind 
of being which allows them to constitute a distinct class of 
being, a distinct predicament. 
Suarez gives several examples of what he mAans by transcen-
dental relations. Matter and form are really related to each 
other; each is defined through its reference to the other. The 
S8.roe can be said of accidental potencies which are essentially 
and intrinSically ordered to their proper acts and receive their 
specification from them. Such relations are transcendental; 
they are real and true relations • 
••• dentur relationes transcendentales, 
quae non sint tantum secundum dici, sed 
verae et reales habitudines secundum 
esse.... Et potest confirmari, nam in 
2.6 I bid., d • 47, s. 3, n. 10. 
genere substantiae materia et forma 
habent inter se veram et reale~ habi- • 
tudinem essentialiter inclusam in pro-
prio esse illarum •••• Eadem ratio est 
de potentiis accidentalibus per se pri-
mo inst~;utiS et ordinatis ad suos ac-
tus ••• 
15 
Suarez proposes the objection that no real reference is in-
cluded in the concept of anything absolute. But a transcenden-
tal reference would necessarily be included in that of an abso-
lute. Therefore, it cannot be a true and genuine reference, but 
only according to our ms.nner of speaking and thinking. 
Dices: nullus realis respectus includi-
tur in conceptu rei abs:)lutae; sed hie 
respectus transcendentalis includitur in 
conceptu rei absolutaej ergo non est 
verus respectus secundum esse, sed tan-
tum secundum modum loquendi et concipien-
di nostrum. a8 
Scotus succumbed to this objection and ended by admitting 
that a transcendental relation is not of the intrinsic nature 
of any being, but rather has to be reduced to the real predica-
ment of relation. 29 
But Suarez would rather agree with Cajetan in saying that 
it is not contrary to the nature of any absolute to include 
within its essence a transcendental reference, proportionate to 
its nature. For example, aptitudinal inherence is of the very 
27 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 11. 
28 Ibid., n. 12. 
29 Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia., apud Ludovicum Vi v~s, Pari-
siis, 1904, Tomus XVII, ~ Llbrum Quartum Sententiarum, 
d. 12, q. 1. 
16 
nature of an accident and is not, as it were, a property conse-
~ 
quent upon that nature • 
••• non esse contra rationem rei absolu-
tae, ut in sua essentiali ratione inclu* 
dat respectum transcendenta1em, suae na-
turae proportionatuc. 30 
Also, no created being is so absolute as to exclude an eSN 
sential relation of dependenc& upon that being which is being 
of its very essence. For, perhaps, the actual dependence is 
distinct from the created being, yet the aptitudinal and neces-
sary dependence is not distinct; it flows from the very essence 
of any contingent being • 
••• verisimile est, in entibus creatis nu1-
11nn esse ita absolutum, quin in sua essen-
tia intime inc1udat ali quem transcenden-
ta1em respectum, sa1tem quatenus est ens 
per partiCipationem, per se essentia1iter 
pendens ab ente per essentiam. 31 
Such relations as these, of matter to form, form to matter, 
accident to substance, active potencies to their act, an act to 
its object, include within their very essence an intrinsic refe 
ence to another princip~e or another being. This relation can-
not be confined to the predicament of relation, but is tran-
scendent and transcendental. 
Suarez takes his basic distinction between transcendental 
30 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 12. 
31 Ibid. 
17 
and predicamental relations from a notation of Cajetan. 32; 
• 
cajetan wants to distinguish the two types of relations by rea-
son of their terms. He says that a predicamental relation views 
its term precisely in so far as it is a term, pure sub ratione 
termini. A transcendental relation looks to its term, not pure-
ly as term, but under some other determination: either as a 
subject, as an object, as an agent (efficiens), or as an end 
(finis). 
In hoc enim differt relatio pertinens 
ad praedicamentum relationis ab aliis 
respectibuB caeterorum generum, qui a 
quibusdam transcendentes vocantur, quod 
respectus pertinens ad genus ad aliquid 
essentialiter est ad aliud, non ut. re-
ceptivum vel causam efficientem aut fi-
nalem aut formalem, sed praecise est ad 
aliud tamquam terminum; unum enim rela-
tivorum nec est forma nee finis g~c ef-
ficiens alterius, sed terminus. 
This reasoning Suarez finds sound. Since relations are 
specified in some way by their terms, if two relations are dif. 
ferent, they should differ in some way, at least, by reason of 
their terms. 
• •• omnis respectus sumit speciem suam a 
termino, seu ab ea re ad quam tendit; et 
ideo, s1 quod est d1scr1men inter hos duos 
ordines respegtuum, ex terminis desumen-
dum videtur. 4 . 
3a Thomae de Vio Cajetani, In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae A u 
natis Commentarium, cura-et-Studio P7 M. H. Laurent, Mariet-
t!, Taurlni, 1934, c. 7, q. 16. 
33 Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 9. 
34 Ibid. 
~------------------------------------------------1-8--' 
bz 
Neve~theless there are two difficulties which Suarez takes , . 
uP before he is wi~ling to rest his position on this line of ar-
gument. First, mo~ion, action, and passion all imply a tran-
scendental relatiorl to their term, and seem to view that term 
only in So far as ~t is term • 
••• motus, actio et passio dicunt tran-
scenoentalem respectum ad terminum, et 
tamerl non respiciunt ilIum, nisi sub 
pura ratione termini. 35 
The second difficuJty which Suarez envisages is that every rela-
tion, taken abstraotly and in general, only implies a reference 
. . 
to such a term whioh is a cause, an effect, an object, or in 
some othe~ way partakes of the nature of a term. For example, 
paternity __ granting for the sake of argument that it is a 
predicamental relation -- v~ews a term which is the effect pro-
duced. 
• •• omnis respectus, si abstracte et in 
communi sumatur, solum dicit habitudi~ 
nem ad aliud sub ratione termini, ab-
strahendo ab aliis rationibus •••• 36 
The first of these two difficulties Suarez dismisses as a 
pseudo-difficulty. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
Respondetur tamen ad priorem rationem 
laborare in aequivoco.... Hoc autem 
modo non potest dici motus, aut actio, 
vel passio esse purus respectus ad ter-
minum; nam habitudo motus ••• non dicit 
habitudinem ad terminum, ut respicien-
~.--------------------------------~ 
b 
tem tantum, sed, ut constituendum per 
ipsum, et ita non respicit ut pure ter-
minum in praedicto sensu; atque idem 
est proportlonaliter de actione et pas-
sione ••• 37 
19 
A predicamental relation is said to view another purely as term, 
because it exercises no other function concerning that term than 
to direct the subject to it, nisi respiciendi tantum. This is 
clearly not the case in motio~, action, or passion; they are not 
just orientations to a term. The order which motion enjoys to 
a term is as a means to that term, a via ad terminQm. So motion 
not only looks toward that term, but in a sense constitutes it. 
Thus it cannot be said to view its term purely and merely as a 
term. The same is true of action and passion. All of these 
Suarez considers to be transcendental relations. Thus a tran-
scendental relation does exercise some function regarding the 
term other than merely relating the subject to that term; these 
functions may be either those of causality, unity, representa-
tion, etc. Predicamental relations, on the other hand, merely 
look toward the term, nothing more. This is clear in the case 
of relations of similitude between two white objects. 
The second difficulty also has its answer. To view some-
thing purely as a term is not to view that term abstractly or 
in general, as the second difficulty supposed. 
Unde etiam patet responsio ad alteram 
rationem, in qua etiam laboratur in ae-
37 Ibid., d. 47, 8. 4, n. 10. 
-quivoco.' Nam respicere aliud ut pure 
terminum, non est respicere terminum 
abstracte et in communi ••• 38 
Different specific predicamental relations view different speci-
fic terms. What is common to all predicamental relations, even 
in the concrete, is that they are content merely to view their 
term without exercising any other function; the function of a 
transcendental relation is, besides viewing and referring the 
subject to the term, to exercise causality of some kind on the 
term. 
Another difference between the two types of relations is 
that a predicamental relation is of such a kind that it is never 
in itself intended by nature. It never of itself comes lnto 
being through some efficient action. It follows upon the foun-
dation and term, once they are given. But transcendental rela-
tions, according to Suarez, are often of themselves intended by 
nature; the form essentially including such a transcendental 
. 
reference often essentially comes into being through the action 
of some agent. 
Respectus ergo praedicamentalis talis 
est l ut a natura non sit per se inten· 
tus, et ideo nunquam per se fit ex vi 
actionis alicujus agentis, sed conse-
quitur posito fundamento et termino •••• 
At vero respectus transcendentalis saepe 
est per se maxime intentus a natura, et 
ideo forma essentialiter includens talem 
respectQm saepe fit formaliter ac per se 
primo per actionem proprj,am •• 0 39 
38 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 11. 
39 Ibid., n. 12. 
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suarez quotes heat and the act of vision as two examples of 
• 
things which contain transcendental relations and whlch directly 
are brought into being. 
The reason behind this is the one we have just seen.: a 
predicamental relation does not exist to fulfil some special and 
peculiar function, but merely to ordain something already exist-
ing to something else. On the other hand, transcendental rela-
tions do have a special office to fulfil, and so directly come 
into being as a result of some kind of action in order that they 
may fulfil their individual functions. This is possible, be-
cause they are always identified with some absolute which is in-
tended by nature. So the relationship which is included in the 
full notion of that absolute also of itself comes into being and 
exist s. 
Respectus ••• transcendentalis convenit 
alic11i formae vel entitati, aut modo 
entis, quatenus a natura per se est in-
stitutus et ordinatus ad aliquod peculi-
are munus, quod pOtest P45 se intendi 
per aliquam actionem ••• 
Suarez mentions a fourth and last distinction between tran-
scendental and predicamental relations. A predicamental relatio 
is conceived as some kind of a form, slight and accidental, it 
is true, which does not give any new added entitative perfection 
to its subject, except to view something else; while a tran-
40 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 12. 
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scendenta1 relation must be taken as an essential difference, 
.. 
rather than as a special accident, which exerts causality of 
some kind on some other being. 
Tandem ex his inte11igitur, respectum 
praedicamentalem concipiendum esse tan-
quam formam quamdam minimam et acciden· 
ta1em, quae non dat subjecto a1iquod esse, 
nisi respicere a1iud, neque ad ali quid 
a1iud in natura deservit. Respectua ••• 
transcendentalis hon est ••• integra forma, 
cujus munus sit tantum referre, sed essen-
tialis modus, seu differentia a1icujus 
formae seu entitatis, quatenus ad causanN 41 
dum a1iquo modo, vel operandum circa alia ••• 
Thus Suarez has limited his subject. He intends to discuss 
predicamental relations which are real and genuine. But before 
going on to Suarez's discussion of the existence and nature of 
these predicamental relations, let us take a brief glance at 
what some of Suarez's predecessors held concerning this predica. 
mente 
HISTORY OF THE QUESTION 
Although the division of being into the ten categories was 
not formally introduced into philosophy until the time of Aris-
totle, because of the intimate connection of the categories with 
being and the fundamental problem of the one and the many, even 
the pre-Aristotelians were in some way conscious of some of the 
problems which the various classifications of reality presented. 
41 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 15. 
-23 
For our purpose~ however, we can omit the Pre~Socratics 
from our historical survey. They were for the most part mon~ 
:tsts , and were intent on developing that aspect of their 
philosophy by seeking the material cause of things. But it is 
only when one admits a real pluralism that the problem of rela" 
tions arises. 
The first important philosopher deserving of special con-
sideration is Plato. To understand the Platonic theory, we must 
understand that Plato began philosophy primarily as an ethician. 
He was interested in the Socratic problem of knowledge only as 
related to the establish~ent of stable moral and ethical ideas. 
43 The early dialogues bear this out. Intent on founding a fi 
absolute, objective basis for such moral virtues as piety, jus-
tice, and the like~ Plato formulated his theory of ideas, sub-
sistent forms or perfections~ which were the norms and standards 
of everything else, thus allowing him to construct a solid meta-
physics of morals. These ideas, existing apart in the topos 
eidon, were the only reality~ or at least, all else was real 
only in the degree in which it participated in the ideas. 44 
42 
43 
44 
Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and 
Ward, New York, 1947, 49 --
Although the chronological problem connected with the dia-
logues has been hotly contested, yet enough unanimity of 
opinion can be found for the three over-all divisions of the 
early, the middle, and the later dialogues. Among the dia-
logues of Plato's youth and early manhood up to his second 
Sicilian journey in 367 B.C., may be found the Euthrphro 
(on holiness), the Phaedo (on the soul), the Phaedrus (on 
the beautiful), the Laches (on courage), and the Meno. 
Plato: Parmenides transl. by ,H. N. Fowler~ G. p.-putnam's 
~--------------~ 2:4 
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45 Being for Plato meant self~identity, that which is always 
• 
the same in itself. In the Platonic synthesis immutability was 
a property of being, so that there was no room for change or 
motion within being. Here Plato met a stone wall: the isola w 
tion and transcendence of the ideas, their remoteness from the 
sphere of what is commonly regarded as reality, was bound to 
become a seriolls problem. 
Just as the absolute nature of the ideas militated against 
a Rolution or explanation of the problem of motion and change, 
it equally blocked the door to an understanding of the nature 
of relation. 46 The basic Platonic error, as St. Thomas fra M 
quently points out, 47 was to confuse and identify the mode of 
mental existence with the mode of real existence. Because the 
mind, due to its spontaneous abstractive process, conceives 
things in their absolute natures, prescinded from their indi-
vidualizing characteristics and all concrete relationships with 
everything else, Plato thought that if the mind was to be a true 
reflection of reality, things had to exist in an absolute state 
independently of the mind. 48 The result was that he hyposta-
45 
46 
47 
48 
Ibid. 
Thomas Aquinas, In Metafhrsicam Aristotelis Commentaria, ed. 
Cathala, Mariett!; Taur n , 1926, L1ber I, lect. 14, n. 213. 
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae et Quaestiones Duo~ 
decim Quodlibetales, Vol. III, De Veritate, Marietti, Tauri-
n1, 1931, q. 21, a. 2. --
S. Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus de Spiritualibus Creaturis, 
'edita a Leo W. Keeler, S.J., apud aedes univ. Gregorianae, 
Romae, 1946, art. 9, ad 5 (114). Cf. also, Francis Mac-
donald Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., New York, 1935, 2. 
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tiZ ed his concepts in the real order and demanded a real world 
• 
of absolutes. In fact, this world of abstract essences was the 
only real world in the strictest sense of real; the world of 
sense was real.only to the extent that it participated in the 
reality of the absolutes. In such a reality where everything 
was complete and fully realized in all its potentialities in it-
self, there was no pla.ce for such a metaphysical monster as re ... 
la ti an. 
Nor could Plato grant there is a real relationship between 
the ideas and the things of sense without falling into an in~ 
finite series of sources of similarity •. For if things partici-
pate in. the ideas through similarity, this, according to Plato's 
own premisses, could only be because both the things and the 
ideas participate in a further idea, which cannot be similar to 
the previous idea or things unless all participated in a still 
more ultimate idea. Plato concludes in his-Parmenides: 
"Because," said Parmenides, "we have 
agreed that those ideas are not rela-
tive to our world, nor our world to 
them, but each only to themselves. n 49 
"Yes, we have agreed to that." 
Therefore, relation for Plato is ultimately inexplicable, since 
tie demands that the ultimate explanation of relation be found 
in the ideas. But the ideas are absolutes; therefore, relation 
can strictly have no place among the ideas, and so it has no 
49 Plato: Parmenides, 134 D. 
b 
26 
lace in reality. 
p '" 
Plato realized the weakness of his theory on this point, 
and so tried to include such ideas as likeness, otherness, etc., 
1n the topos eidon. 50 This was really to distort the basic 
notions of relation, for Plato was forced to treat these rela-
tive notions as absolute~ Likeness was an absolute and as self-
contained as his idea of being. If things in the world of sense 
were similar or like, for Plato it was because they participated 
in the absolute idea of likeness, not because of any relation 
between the two things themselves. But it is clear that two 
things could not become really relative through individual par-
ticipation in an absolute. 
But Plato, to be true to his metaphysical point of depar-
ture, could say no more than this. We have spent a good deal 
of time on Plato since, as we shall see in our critique, Suarez 
to a limited extent, fell into many of the same basic difficul-
ties. 
Aristotle, though he frequently speaks of 7Tfo.s 7, and 
~f;5 r, ;X~f in the course of his Organon and Metaphysics, is 
far from givi~g us a developed theory of relation. In the 
seventh chapter of his Categories he defines the relative: 
50 Plato: Sophistes, transl. by H. N. Fowler, G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, New York, 1928, 254 E ff. 
> 
Those things are called relative, which, 
being either said to be of something else. 
or related to something erse, are exp~ain­
ed by reference to that other thing. I 
Note that Aristotle speaks of the relative rather than of rela-
tion as such. He always considers the concrete subject which is 
similar, unlike, etc. In the Metaphysics he describes what is 
relative as the least of all entities. 52 His reason for this 
is that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or move 
mente 53 
Aristotle never speaks clearly of the exact nature of rela~ 
tlon in itself; he does mention, however, that several of our 
terms are relative and some beings are relatlve. There does not 
seem to be a clear-cut distinction between this category and the 
others. In fact, the other categories seem in some way to imply 
54 
relation in their essential make-up. And "all predicates in 
, 
the category of ~foS 7, involve some other category as well: 
, I 
larger involves Uorov, earlier /TO 7:t , slave v:'frKt"'" farthest, 
~6U , loudest ~o,;v ." 55 But, as Sr. Scheu has written, 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
That Aristotle made relation a separate 
category, because, as Joseph thinks, 
Aristotle: Categories, 6 a 37. For other important remarks 
on the relative, cf.: Cat. 1 b 26; 90Pi 103 b 22; An. Post., 
83 a 21, 83 b 16; Soph:-!I., 178 a ; n. Post., 8~ 20; 
Ig~' 120 b 37, 152 a 39~hys., 225 b~ Meta., 1017 a 25, 
a 8; Ethic. Nich., 1096 a 24; Meta., 1088 823, 1071a30. 
Aristotle: The MetaphysiCs, transl. By Hugh Tredennick, G. P 
Putnam's Sons, New York, 1933-1935, 2 vols. 1088 a 23. 
Ibid., 1088 a 30. 
Scheu, 2:1. 
H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1916, 64-.-
predicates of relation denote "less than 
others what a subject is" seems pl~usi~ • 
ble in view of the Stagirite's claim that 
all the adjectival categories should pre~ 
sent the individual subject in a specific 
light. 56 
28 
In his discussion of relatives in the Metaphlslcs, 57 Aris-
totle shows that relations are based on any of three foundati 
1) unity and number; 2) action and passion; and 3) measure. It 
1s clear that not all of these relatives are equally real, but 
the precise extent of the reality of the various relations is 
left untouched .. 
We should take note of the very undeveloped state of rela-
tions as they exist in the logical and metaphysical treatises of 
Aristotle. There is no question of real or rational rela-
tions, 58 genuine or attributive, transcendental or predica ... 
mental. 
The philosophers in the centuries after Aristotle for the 
most part were in agreement in maintaining the division of the 
ten categories, with relation among them. The stoics 59 and 
the Neo-Platonists 60 worked out different systems to cata-
logue reality, but both outlines had little influence outside of 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Scheu, 21. 
Aristotle: Metaphysics, 1020 b 26~32. 
Scheu, 33. 
Adolf Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. His~ 
torische Beitrage Zur Philosophie:-verlag von G. Bethge,-
Berlin, 1946, 2 vols. 220. 
Friedrich Ueberweg, History of PhiIOSOPh~, transl. by George 
Morris, Charles Scribner's Sons, New Yor , 1892, 2 vols.,249 
b 
61 tneir pr~~er schools. 
• 
Boethtus in his De Trinltate Liber is noteworthy for his 
development of the problem of relations. 62 Because of the 
dogma of tQe three Persons in One God, the early mediaeval theo-
lOgian-philosophers found the reality of at least some relations 
thrust uPan. them. They held that the real unity of God was in 
substance and the real p~urality of Persons lay in relations. 
It is clear that Boethius wanted quantity and quality to 
be real inQerent accidents which definitely add to the perfec-
tion of the substance. 63 It is equally clear that he did not 
consider the other seven accidents in this same sense: 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Reliqua (i.e., praedicamenta) vero neque 
de Deo, neque de oaeteris praedicantur: 
naro ubi, vel de Deo, vel de homine prae-
dicar! poteat; de horoine, ut in foro; de 
Deo, ut ubiquej sed ita, ut non quasi 
ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur, de qua 
dicitur. Non eniro ita homo dicitur in 
foro esse, quemadmodum esse albus vel 
longus, nec quasi circumfusus et determina-
tus proprietate aliqua, qua designari se-
cundum se possit, sed tantum quod sit iI-
Iud aliis informatum rebus, per hanc prae-
dicationem ostenditur. 64 
Quod aliae quidem quasi rem roonstrant, ali-
ae vero circumstantias rei; quodque ilIa 
quidem ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid 
rem ostendant; ilIa vero, ut non esse, 
sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo 
Herbert W. Blunt, "Logic," The Encyclopedia Britannica, 
11th edition, XVI, 904. ---
Boethius: Q! Trinitate Liber, Migne, Patrologiae Cursus 
Comp1etus, Series Latina, Paris, 1841, LXIV, 1254 A. 
Ibid., 1252 B. 
Ibid., 1252 D. 
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affigant. 65 
And he mentions the predicament of rllation explicitly: 
Non igitur dici potestpraedicationem 
relativrun quidquam reU~ qua dicitur 
secundum se" vel adderl, vel minuere 
vel mutare. Quae totanon in eo quod 
est esse consistit" se~in eo quod est 66 
in comparatione aliquolodo se habere. 
• 
So" although Boethius maintains the reality of relations" 
he does not want them to be considerl! as bringing about a real 
addition in the line of perfection t~their subject. In speak-
ing of relations, he writes, 
Quare quae secundum relaicujus" eo quod 
ipsa est" proprietatem,non faciunt prae-
dicationem, nihil alte:rna're vel mutare 
queunt ~ nUllamque omnil~ variare es sen ... 
tiam. 7 
The influence of Boethius in thEcenturies after his death 
is hardly to be overestimated. He W~l the principal channel by 
which Aristotelian logic flowed throtlh the Middle Ages. 68 
His interpretations of the categorie~of Aristotle are constant-
ly mentioned in the long struggle OVE~ the problem of universals 
which is so intimately connected wit]the nature of the predica-
ments. 
But Boethius was not a pure tral1llator of Aristotle. He 
read into hi s Aristotle a good many l:la.tonic, Stoic" Pythagorean 
65 Ibid., 1253 C. 
66 Ibid." 1254 A. 
67 Ibid." 1254 B. 
68 Maurice De Wulf" History of Medielll Philosophy, transl. 'by 
P. Coffey, Longmans" Green" and 0., London, 1909, 145. 
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and Augustinian doctrines, which influences the thought.of the 
following centuries quite as much as his Aristotelianism. 69 
Another important contributor, inspite of his Platonic 
tendencies, to a further understanding of the categories and 
~ predicaments of Aristotle was Gilbert de la Porree. For, as 
De Wulf has written, 
In addition to an exhaustive study of 
the logical writings and deductive me-
thod of Boethius, and of the new logi-
cal works commentated by Theoderic of 
Chartres though unknown to Abelard, Gil-
bert also conceived the idea of complet-
ing Aristotle's study of the categories. 70 
In spite of the fact that the majority of the historians of 
mediaeval philos.ophy place Gilbert de la Porree in the camp of 
moderate realists, it is important to note that st. Thomas men-
tions the "Porretani," i.e., Gilbert and his followers, when 
he is discussing the positi.on of Plato and the Platonists. 71 
Gilbert seems to hold that relations are not intrinsic deter-
minants of their subject, but rather are extrinsic to them and 
stand outside of them. ~he reason for this is that "each real 
object of conceptual thought is viewed as a distinct and separ-
form." 72 Each of these forms exists as such in the real or-
der. But each of these conceptual forms is an absolute. There-
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 194. 
71 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 21, a. 4. 
72. Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., "Principles of St. Thomas's Dis-
tinction between Esse and Ratio of Relation," Modern School. 
man, st. Louis Univ., St. Louis, Vol. XXIV, N. I, Nov. 27. 
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fore, Gilbert concludes that reality is a realm of abso~utes 
73 
and relations do not enjoy real being, ~ ratio essendi. 
Quae vero relativa praedicatio tota con-
sistit ••• non in eo quod est esse (quoniam 
nulli confert aliquid esse), sed potius 
consistit in eo tantum quod est habere se 
ad aliud a in comparatione alterius ad al-terum. 7~ 
But a comparison is a meantal act and can exist only in an in-
tellect. If relations consist in a comparison, then they, too, 
must exist as such only in the mind. They have their being only 
in knowledge, and neither add nor diminish the entitative reali-
ty of the relatives. 
Quandoquidem extrinsecus accessu compara-
tio relatio praedicatur, igitur non potest 
dici praedicationem relativam, id est re-
lationem praedicatam, vel add ere secundum 
se quidquam rei de qua dicitur, vel minu-
ere secundum se, vel mutare secundum see 75 
Kossel in his articles on relation concludes along the same 
lines: 
73 
74 
75 
76 
Though we use the verb to be in predicat-
ing rAlation, Gilbert seems to indicate 
that it is here a pure copula with no exis-
tential significance; it simply indicates 
the movement of the mind in pA.ssing from 
one term to another. If being is in no 
way distinguished from those forms which 
corresp6nd to abstract concepts, relation 
and all the categories involving relation 
must become properties of knowledge alone. 76 
, 
Gilbert de la Porree, In de Trinitate Commentarium, Migne, 
patrolo~ia Latina, LXIV, ~84 B. 
Ibid., 292 c. 
Ibid., 1292 C. 
Kossel, 27-28. 
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Philosophy continued ~lch along the lines of Boeth~us and 
Gilbert de 1a Porree, with the best minds of those thundering 
centuries giving their all to the principal problem of the 1.lni-
versals • 
The majority of philosophers accepted what had become the 
traditional stand on the reality of relations. Almost all of 
them developed and distinguished the concept of relations in ac-
cordance with the exigencies of Trinitarian theology. Even st. 
Thomas first expounded his theory of relations in connection 
with dogma. There seems to be considerable disagreement as re-
gards the precise doctrine which St. Thomas held on relations. 
This much, however, is clear. He demanded real relations, as 
opposed to those of second intention. 77 The distinction 
between predicamenta1 relation and foundation is still a matter 
of dispute. The triumvirate of Thomist commentators, Cajetan, 
John of St. Thomas, and Sylvester of ]lerrara, are unanimous in 
asserting that st. Thomas held a real distinction between rela-
tion and foundation; but, as we aha11 see, Su.arez believes that 
he has St. Thomas on his side when he holds out for a rational 
distinction. 
Perhaps, for our purpose, the most important pre-Suarezian 
philosopher in our brief historical survey is Henry of Ghent, 
77 Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9. 
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the Doctor Solemnis. Although he has been considered by some 
'"' to be a disciple of St. Augustine, it would be more correct to 
call him an eclectic peripatetic. 78 In many aspects of his 
philosophic synthesis he is a forerunner of Suarez, and the 
doctrines of Suarez on such points as the distinction between 
essence and existence in creatures, prime matter's possession 
of existence in its own right,' the principle of individuation, 
and most to our point, the stand on the existence and nature of 
predicamental relations, all harken back to the positions ex-
pounded by Henry of Ghent. 79 
Henry of Ghent holds that, at least, some relations are 
real, because of the explanation of the plurality of persons 
in the Trinity as constituted by these real relations. 80 But 
not only are the divine relations real, but the intellect dis-
covers in nature things which are really related independently 
of the mind. 
Quaedam relatio habet esse in singulari-
bus ex natura ips ius rei extra, non ex 
opere intellectus, sed quam intellectus 
consi~irans rem, invenit circa ipsam 
rem. 
But the nature of this relative reality is not entirely clear in 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, transl. by 
Ernest C. Messinger, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1926, 
2 vols. Vol. II, 60. 
Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand: Essai sur les Tendances de sa 
Metaphysique, J. vrin,-paris, 1938,-xii and 332. -- --
Henry of Ghent: Disputationes Quodlibeticae de omni ~enere 
divinee saiientiae Slam Theo1o~iam vocam~s rere~s me, 
Parisils, 51S, 2 va s., III, ,86 v. 
Ibid., ,",uodl., III, 4, 33 v. 
35 
the mind of Henry. Because of a radical essentialism at the 
• 
root of his philosophic intuition, he is hampered by an abso-
lutism in outlook which makes him want to consider relations as 
absolute, though he knows this cannot be. 
Quomodo autem fit in eis realltas, non 
omnino est perspicuum. Rem enim abBO-
lutam relationen dicere non possumus; 
quidditas enim relationis non est quod 
sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad ali-
quid. Res ergo quae relatio est non 
potest dici res quae est aliquid sive 
quid, sed sol~~ res quae est ad aliquid, 
immo res quae est ipsum esse ad aliquid. 
Hoc autem quomodo ipsum esse ad ali quid 
potest dici §~s, hoc est quod hic ob-
scurum est. 
Since relations are essentially opposed to absolutes, and 
Henry conceived of every separate essence (identified with its 
existence) as an absolute, he concluded that relation could not 
be an essence really distinct from its foundation. It was only 
a resultant respect of that absolute foundation. 
Et est relatio ista realis, quia funda-
tur in re, cujus quidditas est respectu 
alterius ex seipsa, non per ali quid ad-
ditum ei. 83 . 
For if it were really distinct from the foundation, Henry claims 
that it would necessarily be 8.n absolute, and so could act as a 
basis for another relation, and so on without stopping. 
82: Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
Et ipsa relatio •.• non est res aliqua alia 
ab ilIa super quam fundatu~, sed solum re-
spectus ipsius quantitatis et subjecti 
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ejus ••• aliter enim super illam rem 
primo fundaretur ille respectus, et 
ipsa aut subjectum ejus, aut utrum-
que primo per ilIum respectum refer-
retur ad aliud, et tunc ead~m ratio-
ne ille respectus adhuc esset res alia 
qua respectu illo referretur ad aliud 
••• et esset similiter ire in infinitum. 84 
So Henry of Ghent wants relations to be real, but not distinct 
from their foundations; in fact, their whole reality is that 
of their foundations. 
Nullam realitatem habet relatio, nisi 
a suo fundamento ••• ita quod quaecum-
que relationes super idem fundantur, 
eamdem habent realitat~m. 85 
As we shall see'in the remainder of this thesis, this is 
substantially the doctrine that Suarez adopted on relations, 
their existence and nature. It has its roots in Platonism and 
the Pla.tonic confusion of the real and ideal orders. 86 That 
Suarez was conscious of his dependence upon Ghent on many scores 
is clear from the frequency of his quotations from Henry of 
Ghent and his explicit approval of many of the insights of the 
Doctor Solemnis. 
POSITION OF SUAREZ 
The first proof that Suarez himself offers in defense of 
the extra-mental reality of relations is really the same as that 
Ibid., 85 rand 86 v. 
Ibid., Quodl., IX, 3, 75 r. 
cr., F. X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Andreas Blot, 
Parisiis, 1938, 1II-2, 188, 89-95, 24. It is important to 
read these pages in the order in which they are given. 
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of Ghent. It is theological in essence, not philo-
• 
Sophical. 
Since the Catholic Faith teaches that there are three real 
relations in God, constituting and distinguishing the three 
Divine Persons, it is evident that the concept of relation as 
such cannot be merely a word, nor merely an extrinsic denomina-
tion proceeding from a merely mental compa.rison. It really must 
be something of the thing which is related; this must be true 
even in God Hirnself. So Suarez argues that even more so must 
relations be something in contingent and created beings. 
Docet enim fides ••• esse in Deo tres re-
lationes reales, constituentes et dis-
tinguentes divinas personas: ex quo fit 
evidens argumentum, conceptum relationis 
ut aie, non addendo quod creata sit vel 
increata, non ease dictitium, et rem ali-
quam referri non esse denominationem ex-
trinsecam provenientem ex sola compara-
. tione mentis, sed esse aliquid reS, quan-
doquidem in Deo aliquid rei est. 
The only reason why relations could not also be had in 
created beings would be due either to the degree of perfection 
of creatures or because of some implication of imperfection in 
the concept of relation as such. The first is absurd; for if 
relations are not repugnant to God Himself, how could real re-
lations be beneath the perfection of any creature? In God, it 
is true, the relations are substantial, while in creatures they 
are accidental, but this does not in any way change the point 
87 Syarez, d. 47, s. I, n. 11. 
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at issue. 
cidental. 
Relation as such implies neither substantial nor ac-
• 
If there are substantial relations, much more easily 
could there be accidental relations • 
• •• quia rels.tioni ut sic non magis re-
pugnat quod sit accidentalis, quam quod 
sit substantialia, quia sicut accidens 
dicit esse in alio, ita substantia dicit 
esse in se; si ergo cum hac ratione 
conjungi potest esse ad aliud, multo ma-
gis cum ilIa; et alioqui creaturae ut 
sic non repugnat accidens reale; ergo 
nec repugnabit illi talia relatio, quae, 
etsi sit accidentalis, aliquid rei sit. 88 
Nor can real relations in creatures be rejected on the 
score of imperfection, since relation qua relation does not im-
ply any imperfection. It is true that the fact that they are 
accidental relations, does imply some kind of imperfection; but 
such imperfection, implied in the notion of accident, is not 
foreign to the nature of any creature • 
••• relatio ut relatl0 non dicit imper-
fectionem; quod si aliquid imperfecti-
onis ei adjungitur ex eo quod acciden-
talis sit, tali~ imperfectio non est 
extra latitudinem rei creatae. 89 
Suarez admits that many find this theological arg~~ent for 
the reality of relations hard to digest. Since Divine relations 
are outside all the predicaments and would be reducible only to 
the genus of substance, the parity between these Divine rela-
tions and predicamental relations might be denied. 
88 Ibid., d. 47, s. 1, n. 11. 
89 Ibid. 
Argumentum ••• Theologicum aliqu1bus non 
videtur satia efficax ad ostendendas re- • 
lat10nes praedicamentales, quia relati-
ones divisae extra omne praedicamentum 
sunt ••• 9 
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The Divine relation of paternity, for example, which is substan-
tial, can be said to be quasi.transcendentel, i.e., intimately 
included in the adequate concept of the whole be1ng or personal 
substance. Suarez, therefore, concludes that from this first 
argument one can argue, at most, only to real transcendental 
references which are intimately included in the make-up of cer-
ta1n beings. 
Ex 111is ergo relation1bus non videntur 
posse col11g1 relationes praedicamentales, 
sed ad summum respectus reales transcenden-
tales 1-1 ntime inclusi in aliquibus ent1-
bus. 9 
From reason alone, Suarez advances the argument that many 
of our words, which are signs of things, signa suppositiva 
rerum, signify relations which exist in things themselves wlth-
Qut any mental juggling on our part. These :must be based on 
some extra-mental reality. But no absolute being could account 
for these relative concepts and words. Therefore, tncre must 
be come relational reality which can act as a real basis from 
which we form O'.lr concepts and words expressing those concepts. 
There must be real relations over and beyond the absolute es-
sences in nature • 
•• oprobari hoc solet, praeoipue ex locu-
90 Ibid., n. 13. 
91 Ibid. 
tionibus et denominationibus relativis 
quae in rebus ipsis existunt, absque ul-
la fictione intellectus, quas proinde 
necess8.est in aliquo ente reali fun-
dari; non fundantur autem in absoluto; 
ergo in relativo; da~~ er60 in rebus 
ens reale relativum .• 
40 
EXamples of such concepts and words which need a real relative 
basis for their validity spring immediately to mind: greater, 
less, equal, similar, near, fa.r away, father, son, etc. 
But not merely are individual beings relative in their con-
crete existence, but the total and complex order in the universe 
gives evident and convincing proof that relation, predicamental 
relation, is real. This is but a reiteration of st. Thomas's 
proof in the De Potentia. 93 The universe is composed of ab-
solutes, and yet there exists betw~en these beings a certain 
order and relationship, which is not of the essence of any be-
ing, but is nonetheless real for all of that. This order is 
strictly accidental to these beings which are in themselves ab-
solutes. Suarez gives an example fr?m the heavenly bodies which 
resounds the strain of mediaeval physics. 
Nam etsi elements. et coeli alio ordine 
constituerentur, res ipsae absolutae 
eaedem sunt; est ergo ordo, quem nunc 
habent, a1iquid accidentarium ipsis. 94 
This extrinsic and accidental order between beings is evi-
9a Ibid., n. 12. 
93 De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9. 
94 Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, n. 14. 
~-------, r r 41 
dent in every aspect of reality. We see it in the finality of 
• 
beings, in their efficiency, in knowledge, in volition. Any 
similarity existing between beings is explicable only in terms 
of efficiency and finality, terms which imply further relationN 
ships. For, as st. ~homas reminds us, if two beings are similar 
it is either because one was the cause of the other, ~ agens 
agit sibi simile, or because both of the beings proceeded from 
a common efficient cause to which they are related. 95 
This patent ordering cannot merely be a product of the 
human intellect, for it arises from and in things themselves, 
and pertains to the objective perfection of the universe. 
Et non est aliq~id per rationem confic-
tum, nam per se constat in rebus ipsis 
esse, et ad magnam universi perfectionem 
spectare. 96 
And so relations !nust pertain·to 8. special predicament. 
They are not of the intrinsic make-up of anyone absolute being, 
nor can they be reduceo t) any of the other predicaments. Sub ... 
stance, quantity, and quality belong to a being absolutely; the 
last six predicaments in some way follow upon relations, and so 
presuppose them. Therefore, there exist in nature real predica-
ment~l relations • 
••• at non est nisi relatio, quurn neces ... 
se est per se ad proprium praedicamentum 
95 De Veritate, q. 2, a. 14; q. 8, a. 8. 
96 Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, no 14. 
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pertinere, ~uia non est de intrinseca 
ratione alicujus rei absolutae, nee 
etiam signari potest ad quod aliorum 
praedic~,entorum pertineat vel revo-
cetur. 
• 
Suarez briefly mentions two other proofs without developing 
them in any detail. 
The various relationships found to exist among things can 
vary while the absolute form related remains the same. There ... 
fore, over and above the beings which are absolute, there must 
also exist real relations irreducible to any absolute predica-
mente 
••• illas esse tales ut accidant rebus 
creatis absolutis, possintque variari 
in aliquo subject09~ine amissione for-
mae absolutae... . 
Also these relationships cannot be explained through any 
mere extrinsic denomination. Secundum est, has ~ ~ denomi-
99 nationes mere extrinsecas... Every extrinsic denomination 
is taken from something intrinsic. But with the denial of real 
relGtlons, the only things that could be intrinsic would be an 
aosolute of some kind. But no relative extrinsic denomina.tion 
could be had merely from an absolute. If there is an extrinsic 
denomination in any particular instance, it is had only becatise 
of some real relation existing in one of the terms. If one 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., n. 15. 
99' Ibid. 
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denies that real relationship, he also has denied the basis 
• 
for any true extrinsic denomination. 100 
Thus Suarez has proved to his own satisfaction that there 
are real predicamental relations. The problems which remain 
all spring from a consideration of the nature of those relations 
100 Ibid. ,. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS 
DEFINITION 
Thus far, our entire treatment has revolved around the 
question whether there are such things as real predicamental 
relations. Suarez now considers the essence or nature of those 
relations. 
He defines a predicamental relation as: 
Accidens cujus totum esse est ad aliud 
esse seu ad aliud se habere, seu aliud 
respicere. I 
He claims that this is identical with the second definition that 
Aristotle gives in the seventh chapter of his Categories. 2 
Any strict definition must be had through genus and speci-
fic difference. 3 None of the predicaments can be defined 
strictly, 4 since they themselves are the ten supreme genera, 
and 80 do not fall under any higher genus nor are differentiated 
by any specific difference. 
However, speaking loosely, we can say that the "genus" in 
Suarez's definition of predicamental relation is the term acci-
1 DiSa. Meta., d. 47, s. 5, n. 2. a Ibl. 
3 Ibid., d. 6, s. 9, n. 22. 
4 Ibid., d. 39, s. 2, n. 29. 44 
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denS, accident. 5 This excludes Divine relations which are not ~ , 
• 
accidents, but substantial. It also excludes, as is obvious, 
all created substances, which can in no way be predicamental re~ 
lations. It also excludes, as may not be so obvious, all ra-
tional relations, since these are not strictly speaking acci-
dents, for accidents are subdivisions of real being. 
Accidens ergo positum est in illa defini-
tione loco generis. Per quod imprimis ex-
cluduntur divinae relationes, quae non sunt 
accidentia, sed substantiae. Excluduntur 
deinde omnes substantiae creatae, quae re-
lationes praedicamentales esse non possunt 
••• Excluduntur praeterea relationes ra-
tionis, quae proprie et simpliciter non 
possunt dici accidentia, cum accidens sim-
pliciter dictum sub ente reali contineatur. 6 
In this, Suarez stands against Cajetan, who states that the gen-
eral over-all definition of relation includes both real and ra-
tional relations. 7 But, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
Suarez wants the formal notion of relation, ~ ad, to apply 
only to real relations, and to rational relations only by some 
kind of analogy or proportion or comparison w:J.th real relations.8 
The second part of the definition, cujus totum ~ est ad 
aliud ~ ~ ad aliud se habere, ~ aliud respicere, is taken 
as its "specific difference," for this phrase specifies and 
cuts off predicamental relations from all the other accidents, 
5 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Cajetan, In Summam Theologicam Commentarium, In I, q. 13, a.7 
8 Suarez, d:-47 , s. 5, n. 3. 
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which have their existence only in a subject, not through a 
reference to something outside that subject. 
Altera pars illius definitionis, quae 
locum differentiae habet, separat prae-
dicamentum hoc a reliquis praedicamen-
tis accidentium ••• 9 
• 
It might seem that this definition would be applicable, not 
only to predicamental relations, but to transcendental relations 
as well. But this is not true. When Suarez says cujus totum 
esse est esse ad aliud, we must remember the fundamental dis-
-----
tinction he made previously between predicamental and transcen-
dental relations. A transcendental relation does more than im-
ply a reference to some other being as its term; it enjoys oth 
dynamiC functions as well. But a predicamental relation is one 
whose entire essence is only to imply an ordination to some-
thing else, cujus TOTUM ~ est ~ ad aliud. 10 
A second difficulty with Suarez's definition presents it-
self. This time it arises from a seemingly intrinsic contra-
diction in the terms of the definition itself. If a predica-
mental relation is an accident, then it is impossible for its 
entire essence to consist in a reference to another. That es-
sence, in so far as it is the essence of an accident, must also 
include an ordination to its subject of inherence, inesse. 11 
----.. -------
9 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 4. 
10 Ibid., n. 5. 
11 Ibid., n. 6. 
• •• nam si relatio est accidens, ergo 
non potest totum esse illius cons is-
tere in habitudine ad aliud; neces-
se est enim ut aliquid ejus in sub-
jecto sit, ut ea ratione accidens 
esse posi~t, cum accidentis esse sit 
inesse. 
• 
47 
There are various answers to this objection, but Suarez re-
jects them, because they all seem to imply in one way or another 
a real distinction between the essence and the existence of a 
relation by demanding a real diversity between the ~ ad and 
and the ~ in. For example, some claim that when a predica-
mental relation is said to have its whole essence consist in an 
orientation to another, what is meant is that the essence proper 
to a relation is wholly an order to another, but not that es-
sence under its accidental aspect. This latter aspect it has 
in common with the other accidents. This gave rise to the dis-
tinction between the esse ad and the esse in of the relation. 
According to this opinion, the ~ ad as such, prescinds from 
all real existence, and so can be applied univocally to real 
and rational relations. 13 
But Suarez is adamant in rejecting this line of reasoning, 
for, as he reasons, an accident does not just inhere in a sub-
ject without being any particular and proper nature. It is al-
ways a particularized form inhering in this particular subject. 
-
12 Ibid. 
13 IbId. 
~wrlte that the ~ !£ does not commit itself to be 48 what it 
• 
1s, namely, the particular accidental form of ~ ad, is to 
speak of an abstraction, in no way significant in a discussion 
of reality. Also, if the above argumentation were true, Suarez 
claims that no predicamental relation would ever attribute its 
proper, formal, and relative effect to its subject, since no ac-
cident can cause a formal effect unless it is actually inhering 
in the subject. A real relation and a real esse ad cannot be a 
real relation and a real ~ ad unless it is simultaneously 
an ~ in. 
• •• de ratione accidentis, prout in re 
ipsa existit, non solum est quod insit 
secundum aliquam rationem generics.m vel 
communem, sed etiam secundum propriam, 
et prout est talis forma in rerum natura; 
imo impossibile est quod forma informet 
vel afficiat secundum communem rationem, 
et non secundum ali quam propriam, cum 
hac ri4ione a parte rei non distinguan-
tur • 
••• alias relatio non tribueret subjecto 
proprium effectum formalem relativum, 
quia accidens non dat effectum formalem, 
nisi inhaerendo et afficiendoj si ergo 
relatio non inest secundum propriam ra-
tionem, non confert pro£Sium et specifi-
cum effectum formalem. 
Lastly, Suarez objects that if the predicamental relation 
did not inhere, it would be nothing: it would not be a sub-
stance, and upon the supposition that it does not inhere in any 
14 Ibid., d. 47,. 50 5, n. 6. 
15 Ibid. 
• 
subject# it could not be an accident. Therefore# it would ~ 
be anything real. So Suarez concludes: 
••• concedendum est relationem secundum 
se totam esse accidens; haec enim ratio 
••• est quasi transcendentalis respectu 
novem praedicamentorum. Unde# cum dici-
tur totumesse relationis esse ad aliud# 
particular exclusiva ibi virtualiter con-
tenta non excludit concomitantia# seu ex-
trinsecas et transcendentales rationes; 
quare, sicut non excludit rationem entis 
realis# ita nec rationem accidentis et 
inhaerentis. Solum ergo excludit esse 
absolutum, et indicat, esse relationis ut 
sic non sistere in subjecto, quod suo 
• 
modo afficit seu denominat# sed illud or-
dinare ad terminum, et in hoc positam 
esse totam formalem rationem relationis. 16 
A predicamental relation must according to its whole nature ~e 
an accident, which connotes a transcendental relation to its 
subject of inherence. The only thing# then, which a predica. 
mental relation does exclude is an absolute nature; it does 
not stop merely in its ordination to its subject, but goes on 
further to refer that subject to another term. 17 
But when Suarez says that the essence of a predicamentalr 
lation is ad aliud ~ ~ ad aliud ~ habere# does he mean 
. 
that the eseence of relation is actually to refer the SUbject 
to the term, or only to be apt to refer that subject so that it 
would be related to something else? It might seem that the 
mind can conceive of a relation as affecting its subject, and 
yet not referring that subject to anything outside of itself. 
16 Ibid., d. 47# s. 5# n. 7. 
17 IbId. 
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Even the theologians admit that in Divine relations paternity 
can be conceived as constituting the first Person of the Blessed 
T i it i t 1 ti f f any kind. 18 r n y, pr or 0 any re a on or re erence 0 
Suarez is clear that a thing is apt to be related to some-
thing else, not by reason of the relation itself, but by reason 
of the proximate foundation. The proper formal effect of a re-
. 
lation is actually to relate the subject9 And, as he says, 
••• alias nec distingueretur, etiam se-
cundum rationem formalem, a fundamento, 
nec requireret coexistentiam termini, 
nec vere diceretur totum esse ejus posi-
tum esse in respectu ad aliud. I9 
In answering this objection Suarez reminds us that it is 
not one and the same thing to ask whether the formal effect of 
an accident is to constitute something to be such and such, and 
to ask whether it is of the essence of an accident actually to 
exercise its formal effect. 
o.oaliud esse considerare an effectus 
formalis accidentis sit constituere actu 
tale, aliud vero an de essentia accidan-
tis sit actu exercere suum affectum for-
malem; haec enim duo distincta sunt. 20 
For example, it is true to say that the formal effect of an ac-
cidental form of whiteness is to constitute something actually 
white, and not only aptitudinally white, although, absolutely 
considered, it is not ot the essence of whiteness actually to 
18 Ibid., n. 9. 
19 Ibid., n. 10. 
20 !btd~, n. 11. 
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confer that formal effect on any subject. Although it is not 
.0; 
of the essence of whiteness, simply speaking, actually to con~ 
stitute something white, nevertheless, it is of the essence of 
. 
whiteness as affecting and informing a subject, actually to con-
stitute the being white. The same can be said of relations. 21 
There are some accidents which of their very essence can-
. 
not exist in reality without affecting a subject; such are re-
lations. 
Relationes ••• non possunt esse in rerum 
natura, quin actu referant, eo quod non 
possint ab omni subjecto separatae con-
servari, quia in re non distinguuntur a 
suis proximis subjectis ••• 22 
For unlike quantity and quality which can, with no intrinsic re-
pugnance, exist (as in the Blessed Sacrament} without an actual 
subject of inherence, predicamental relations cannot exist nor 
be conceived separated from their proximate subjects. As we 
shall see, Suarez holds that the relations are really identified 
with those proximate subjects, their foundations. But if other 
accidents are conserved through Divine power without their pro-
per subject of inherence, then any predicamental relation which 
has such an accident for its foundation, can also be conserved 
in this way. 
21 Ibid. 
Sicut autem verius est, relationem non 
esse rem distinctam a fundamento, ita 
etiam verius esse non posse ab illo 
22 Ibid., n. 12. 
separatam, vel per se conservari •••• 
Unde eatenus etiam pot est talis rela-
tio conservari separata a tali subjec-
to, quatenus ilIa res, quae est runda-
mentum ejus,zgotest sine illo subjecto 
conservari. 
• 
As a last point, Suarez insists that it is impossible to 
conceive or relation with its formal and proper effect, without 
conceiving it as actually relating its subject to the term. It 
may be that the intellect has a confused and indistinct concept 
of relation and its foundation, and thus tries to think of it 
as not actually exercising its formal effect of relation • 
••• impossibile esse concipere relatio-
nem cum suo effectu formali plene ac 
proprie concepto'22uin concipiatur ut 
actu rererens ••• 
Arter settling the questions of the existence and the de-
finition of a predicamental relation, Suarez then takes up the 
elements that must enter into any relation. 
ELEMENTS OF A RELATION 
No relation of itself ever comes into being; it results 
or follows from the foundation once the term is given. There-
fore, there is no strict efficient cause or a relation other 
than the cause of the foundation and term • 
••• cum per se non riat, sed resultet, 
23 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 12. 
24 Ibid., n. 13. 
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vel formaliter consequatur positis 
fundamento et termino, nullam habet 
vel requirit efficientem causam, prae-
ter eas quae fundamentum et terminum 
efficiunt. ~5 
If one held the relation was really distinct from the foundatio 
then, perhaps, he could hold some kind of efficiency. But be-
Suarez denies this real distinction, he must claim only formal 
resultancy, not efficient. 26 
Since no predicamental relation is ever of itself intended 
by any agent, it does not enjoy any strict final cause. 
Cum enim haec relatio non sit per se 
intenta in rebus, non habet proprie 
causam finalem, quamvis eo modo quo est, 
dici possit esse propter suum f02,alem effectum, vel propter terminum. 
Efficient and final causality go hand in hand; if the efficient 
cause is lacking, no final causality in the strict sense of the 
word is had. 
Since relation is itself some kind of a form, it does not 
have any other proper and physical formal cause, but has its 
own quiddity and formal metaphysical essence • 
••• cum ipsa relatio sit forma quaedam, 
non habet aliam causam formalem pro-
priam et physicam, sed habet suam quia-
ditat~~, et rationem formalem metaphysi-
cam. 
25 Ibid., d. 47, s. 6, n. 1. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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In so far as the term specifies a relation, one could say,. per-
haps, that the term participates in tfie nature of a formal 
c-ause. The precise nature of this ]articipation we shall see 
in more detail in a moment. 
The foundation and subj ect fulfill the function of the 
material cause of a relation. 
Fundamentum vero et sll~iectum ca~sam 
materialem complere v1j~ntur... 9 
So all the causes and principles of any relation are to be found 
in its subject, foundation, and term. 
SUBJECT OF A RELIT! ON 
That every predicarnental relath does require a real sub-
iect is obvious to anyone who consH!ls the matter howsoever 
... 
lightly. The reasons for this are cliar enough. A predicamen-
tal relation is an accident. But eV!lr accident requires a sub-
ject. Therefore, every predicamentalrelation will require a 
subject. 
• •• dicendum est omnem r~lationem prae-
dicamentalem requirerealiquod subjec-
tum reale. Haec est clara, nam relatio 
es t accidens, ••• omne aut!1Q accidens re-
quirit aliquod subjectun; ergo. 30 
A second proof that Suarez tosses of lin passing is that a rela-
tion is a form. But a form must alw8ji inform something; that 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., n. 2. 
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.hich it informs is called its subject. Therefore I every pre-
dicamental relation demands a sUbject • 
••• relatio est quaedam forma; omnia 
autem forma aliquid informatj id au-
tem quod informat l dicitur subjectum 
ejus l praesertim3fi ei inhaereat l et 
ab eo pendeat ••• 
.. 
Sometimes I it is true l philosophers speak abstractly of re-
lation, such as paternitYI similitude l equality, etc. But in 
the concrete l it is really a father or something which is simi-
lar or equal to something else. In the concrete l a relation al-
ways needs a subject. In fact, what is really relative is the 
combination of the subject and the relatlon • 
••• nam relativum in concreto non habet 
proprie Bubjectum, sed potius ipsurn est 
quid constana ex subjecto et relatione l 
ai formaliter sumatur ut relativum estl 
seu ut compositu~ quoddam ex relatione 
et subjecto ejus. 32 
Relations are never of themselves relative; they are that by 
which the subject is relative. 
Granting that every relation must have a subjectl the quea-
tion arises whether one single relation can have more than one 
subject or must it be content with one and only one. Henry of 
Ghent I as he writes in his Quodlibeta l 33 thought that since 
a relation is between two terms l it could be said to be in both 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Disp. Quodl., IXI q. 3. 
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terms as in subjects. Thus, there would be but one relationship 
between father and son, between son and father. 
Suarez, however, sees this as impossible; for one and the 
same numerical accident could not be in really distinct sub-
34 jects. For a relation, as a simple form, is strictly one 
with a true and proper metaphysical unity; it could not simul-
taneously coexist in two different subjects. Otherwise, a re-
lation would really be an aggregate of two mutual relations, 
called a single relation merely for convenience. But a mutual 
relationship, taken as one thing, is a product of reason, and 
does not pertain as such to the real order. So since a predica-
mental relation does not subsist by itself, it must inhere in 
something, and in only one subject • 
••• ergo necesse est ut in relationibus 
realibus et accidentalibus sit aliquid 
reale et accidentale, et ita redit ar-
gumentum factum, quod debet esse in uno 
aliquo subjecto. ~5 
Some relations can be said to be in more than one subje~t, 
if those subjects are themselves subordinated one to another. 
Verumtamen ~ujusmodi relatio per se ac 
proprie solum afficit proximum subjec-
tum, in quo suo modo inest; ad subjec-
tum autem remotum solum comparatur me-
dio proximo, in quantum hoc in illo in-
inest et sustentatur. 06 
-.- - . ------
34 Suarez, d. 47, s. 6, n. 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibla:, n. 5 • 
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For example, the accidental relation of equality inheres im-
• 
mediately and proximately in the accident of quantity, and ul-
timately in the substance itself. Likeness has a quality for 
its proximate subject, the substance as its remot~ subject. But 
note that in these cases the two subjects are subordinated to 
each other, and the relation can be said to inhere in the re-
mote subject only because it inheres immediately in the proxi-
mate subject. 
Suarez makes an interesting appendage to this point: 
••• interdum relatio aeque vel in eodem 
modo denominat subjectum proximum et re-
motum, ut quantitas dicitur aequalis, et 
similter substantia materialis; et al-
bedo dicitur similis, et ipsum album, vel 
etiam subjectum, ut homo, vel paries. Ali-
quando relatio denominat subjectum proxi-
mum, et non remotum, ut intellectus dici-
tur referri relatione potentiae ad suum ac-
tum, anima vero non item, et sic de aliis. 
Aliquando, e converso, relatio denominat 
subjectum remotum, vel suppositum ipsum, 
et non proximum, ut filiatio denominat 
suppositum filium, non vero humanitatem, 
quamvis probabileeit proxime inesse hu-
manitati; et paternitas paroxime dicitur 
esse in potentia, et tamen non denominat 
patrem, nisi ipsum suppositum. 37 
Thus, some relations refer both the ultimate and the proximate 
subjects to'a term, as in the case of equality and similarity. 
Other relations, however, orientate only their proximate sub-
jec~s, as its in the case of intellection and volition, where 
the faculty is related to its operation as potency to act, while 
37 !.bid., n. 6. 
> 
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tniS cannot be said of its ultimate subject, the human soul. 
still other relations refer their ultimate sUbjects to a term 
rather than their proximate subjects. Suarez's example of this 
is in the relations of filiation and paternity, where the rela-
tion ordains the entire supposit to the term, rather than the 
humanity of the father or the son, which he believes is the 
proximate subject of the relations. 
The reason behind all this is ultimately the diversity in 
the nature of the various foundations. We shall see Suarez go . 
into this matter more at length when we take up his treatment 
of the various types of relational foundations. 
FOUNDATION OF A RELATION 
The second element which Suarez gives as contributing to 
the entity of a predicamenta1 relation is the foundation. Suarez 
nowhere offers a formal definition of the term foundation, but 
it is clear from his constant usage of the term that he accepts 
the traditional meaning of foundation as the reason why the sub-
ject is related to the term, id propter quod subjectum ad termi-
num refertur. 
The first and most important thing to be said about the 
foundation of a predicamenta1 relation is that a real foundation 
is required for every real relation. 
Circa fundamentum autem re1ationis prin-
cipio statudendum in communi est, omnem 
relationem rg~lem indigere ali quo reali 
fundamento. 
There is hardly a philosopher who has ever denied this; 
necessity is obvious. 
.. 
59 
its 
Suarez gives as his first proof of the necssity of a real 
foundation one which is valid only granting Suarez's position 
on the distinction, ora ragher the lack of it, between the 
foundation and the relation. Since a relation does not have any 
proper entity of its own -- for according to Suarez it is not 
really distinct from its absolute foundation it must partake 
of the entity of something else. But it cannot enjoy the enti-
ty of the term since t.he term is extrinsic and distlnct, while 
the entity of a thing must be intrinsic to it. Thus, the real 
relation must take its entity from its foundation, which will 
always be required • 
••• relatio ex se non habet propriam en-
titatem ••• ergo necesse est ut habeat il-
lam~ •• ab aliquo alio; ••• habet relatio 
realis suam entitatem a fundamento reali; 
ergo semper illud requirit. 39 
An added reason ts that since no predicamental relation as 
such ever of itself comes into being or is intended as the pri-
mary object of any agent, it must result from some other cause 
which 1s directly intended. This cause from which the relation 
results is the real foundation. 
38 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 1. 
39 Ibid. 
l~ 
••• relatio tal~~t naturae, nec per 
se fiat, nec s~~r se intenta in na-
tura; ergo conii~ui tur et quasi resul-
tat in suo subj!~to, posito termino; 
ergo requiri t iuubjecto aliquam realem 
rationem vel CaUiill1 ob quam in illo re-
sultat talis relatio, posito tali termi-
no. 40 
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But must this foundation~! really distinct from the ulti-
mate subject of the relationshl,? Suarez first clarifies the 
issue by distinguishing betwe!nthe proximate and the remote or 
ultimate subject of a relation, Of the former, the proximate 
subject of inherence, no otherfoundation is needed than that 
very subject, for the foundat!~n and proximate subject are one 
and the same. 
Et quidem de pr!~ri subjecto (proximo) 
certum est non ~I~rtere ut praeter il-
lud sit aliud fun!amentum relationis 
ex natura rei a~!llo distinctum, alio-
qui esset abeunuum in infinitum. 41 
Thus the relation of equali tylnich inheres immediately in the 
accident of quanti ty as in a su~Ject needs no other basis or 
foundation than quanti ty itself, 
But the difficulty arises!n regard to the principal and 
ultimate subject. Is it nece5iary that in respect to the sub-
stance every real predicamentalrelation require another acci-
dental foundation really distfu~t from the substance? Many 
claim that such an intermedia1jaccidental foundation is neces-
40 Ibid. 
41 I~id., n. 2. 
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gary, especially if the relation is not really distinct from 
the proximate subject. These philosophers demand that any ac-
cidental relation must be founded upon another accident, an ab-
solute foundation from which it may receive ita accidental en-
42 tity. If this were not true, then the relation, identified 
with its foundation, which would be a substance, would no longer 
be entitatively an accident, but a substance. 
In spite of the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas seem to 
hold that an intermediary accidental foundatton is always re-
~lired, Suarez is explicit in denying that an accident must al-
ways be the foundation for a predicamental relation. 
Nihilominus dicendum est, necessarium non 
esse ut fundamentum proximum relationis sit 
aliquod accidens, vel res aliqua, aut modus 
realia, ex natura rei distinctus a primo 
subjecto relationis. 43 
In some cases he thinks the substance itself is sufficient. For 
the foundation is nothing other than the real cause why some-
thing is related to something else. There can be no reason why 
the intrinsic nature of a being cannot be the cause and reason 
why two things are similar, or in some other way related. 
Cur enim, sicut quantitas ex sua naturali 
conditione et natura habet sufficientem 
rationem ob quam ad illam consequantur 
quaedam relationes, et similiter qualitas, 
non potest etiam substantia simile quip-
piam habere per seipsam? 44 
42 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 2. 
43 Ibid., n. 4. 
44 Ibid. 
Many examples could be given, some of which Suarez himself 
~ 
mentions, of instances where a thing is related because of its 
very substantial essence. Creation is on the part of the crea-
ture a predicamental relation; yet its foundation is the very 
nature of the creature itself. 45 For even granting that depen-
dence would be for some a really distinct mode, and that this 
mode would be the foundation af the relation of creature to God, 
nevertheless, this mode is not an accident, and so does not 
touch the point at issue. Suarez 'cites as added proof the rela-
tion of filiation: 
Et confirmatur in relatione filiationis, 
quae non potest ita fundari in generatio-
ne activa vel passiva, ut illi proxime 
insit, nam transacta actuali generatione 
permanet relatio filiationis. Nec potest 
fundari in alio antecedente, quia nullum 
est quod sit causa ejusj fundatur ergo 
in ipsamet substantia. Ratio autem est, 
quia substantia ipsa creaturae, quatenus 
creabilis est, vel generabilis ab alia 
causa, est sufficiens ut in ea possit 
fundari relatio, si a tali causa, creata 
vel genita sit. 46 
The foundation of this relation can be nothing other than the 
substance of the son himself, for the foundation must endure as 
long as the relation is had. But anything else, e.g., the ac-
tual act of generation, comes and goes, while the relation of 
filiation still remains. The substance of the son in so far as 
it is either created or generated is a sufficient reason for 
45 Ibido, n. 6. 
46 IbId., n. 7. 
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the foundation of the relation of filiation; nothing else is 
.. 
needed. 
But what about the objection Suarez himself brought against 
this position? If the relation is not distinct from the founda-
tion, and the foundation is a substance, then the relation, too, 
would be a substance. Suarez writes, 
••• de divisione entis in sUbstantiam et 
accidens, proprium et physicum accidens 
non posse esse in re omnino idem cum 
substantia; accidens vero praedicamen-
tale interdum posse sola ratione ratio-
cinata distingui.... Sic ergo dicendum 
est, relationes, quae proxime in sub-
stantia fundantur, non esse accidentia 
phsyica, et quoad entitatem suam, sed 
solum esse accidentia praedicamentalia, 
quoad figuram et modum praedicationis, 
quia secundum rationem formalem suam 
sunt extra rationem substantiae, et ideo 
non est inconveniens quod~tales rela-
tiones non distinguantur in re a sub-
stantia. 47 
There is an important distinction present in these words which 
must be grasped to understand Suarez's position on the nature 
of an accident. When treating of accidents in general he de-
fines what he means bya physical accident and what he means by 
a predicamental accident: 
Potest enim accidens sumi, vel pro enti-
tate accidentali secundum se, at secundum 
suam tantum realitatem; vel pro qua cum-
que ratione formali accidentis, quae in 
praedicamentis collocantur. Quod aliis 
etiam terminis dici solet, accidens posse 
47 .!E!'~.", d. 47, s. 7, n. 8. 
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Crucial in any discussion of the foundation of a predica-
mental re1ltion is its distinction from the relation. Prac-
tically every theory possible on this point has been held by 
some philosopher or other through the centuries. 
As is his wont, Suarez first review all the previous doe-
trines and opinions on this question before he states what he 
himself holds. 
The majority of Thomists, led by Capreo1us, Cajetan, and 
Ferrara, demand a real distinction between relations and their 
subjects and foundations. 50 
Scotus distinguishes some relations which in no way are 
separable from their foundations from those which can be separat 
ed, as for example, the relations of similitude. These latter, 
Scotus admits, are really distinot from their foundations, while 
the others which are inseparable are not really distinct, since 
the Scotist criterion of a real distinction, sc1., separability, 
is not present. 51 
Durandus makes use of still another distinction in this 
question. He claims that there are some relations which are 
real orders or references consequent upon their foundations. 
There are, however, other relations which are merely relative 
denominations, e.g., to be equal or to be similar. These latter 
50 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 2. 
51 !bid;, n. 3. 
66 ~re not really 
, 
distinct from their foundations and add nothing 
.. 
over and above the concomitant coexistence of the two absolute 
terms. These denominations Durandus still wants to pertain to 
the predicament of relation and be suffiCient" to constitute a 
real relation. Durandus's argument for the real distinction in 
the former examples is the old one of separability. 52: 
Still others would prefer a modal distinction between rela-
tion and foundation; others argue for a formal distinction. 53 
But Suarez rejects all of these positions and finally decides 
to place his philosophical chips with the Nominalists, Ockham, 
and Hervaeus by placing only a rational distinction between re-
lation and foundation. 
Inter has ergo sententias mihi maxime 
probatur quinta, quam Hervaeus et non-
nulli alii Thomistae docuere, a quorum 
sensu fere nihil discrepant Nominales ••• 54 
He does not want to admit even for a moment that this ra-
tional distinction makes the formal essence of relation nothing 
real or merely an extrinsic denomination taken from some abso-
lute form. This would destroy the real predicament of relation 
which he desires to establish. Rather the relation is some in-
trinsic form of the thing related, but not to be either a thing 
or a mode really distinct from any absolute form. It is that 
52 Ibid., n. 4. 
53 Ibid., n. 7. 
54 ibid., n. 22 .• 
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same absolute form, which is its foundation, taken, not abso-
.. 
lutely, but as viewing and looking toward something else con-
noted by the relative denomination • 
••• respondetur, esse relationis in re 
non esse aliud ab esse fundamenti, ra-
tione tamen distingui, quatenus illud-
met esse concipiatur ut includens ali-
quo modo, seu connotans terminum quem 
respicit. 55 
Thus, the relation of similitude would be nothing other than the 
form, e.g., of whiteness, precisely in so far as this form of 
whiteness connotes another white object as a term. 56 
Suarez believes that such an explanation more than suffices 
to explain the various ways of speaking of things, and also to 
maintain a distinct predicament of relation. 
Atque haec distinctio rationis sufficit, 
tum ad diversas loquendi formas, tum 
etiam ad praedicamentorum distinctionem ••• 57 
The chief argument which his opponents offered in favour 
of something more than a merely rational distinction between 
foundation and relation was the argument from separability. If 
the term of a relation is destroyed, then relation of the sub-
ject to that term also perishes, even though no intrinsic change 
has occured as regards the subject and foundation taken in them-
selves. If this is true, then the relation must necessarily be 
really distinct from that subject and foundation. Suarez's 
55 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 23. 
56 Ibid., n. 22. 
57 Ibid. 
answer to that argument is as follows: 
••• negamus enim relationem separari un-
quam a fundamento secundum aliquid reale 
quod ei intrinsecum sit. Sed solum con-
tingit, separari aut destitui terminum, 
quo ablato cessat etiam relativa denomi-
netio, non quia aliquid rei vel realis 
modi auferatur, ab ipso relativo, sed 
quia denominatio relativa includit ali-
quo modo terminum, sine quo non manet ac-
tualiter sed fundamentaliter tantum, seu 
in proxima aptitudine. 58 
68 
Thus, the relation is the foundation as connoting the term. If 
one removes the term, the connotation is destroyed, while the 
foundation remains entitatively untouched. 
If Suarez's adversaries pushed the point that if a white 
object, which was not similar to another, suddenly becomes simi-
lar, then that relation of similitude is either something (a 
new entitative perfection) or nothing, Suarez would fling back 
the reply: 
••• praeter ilIa duo membra est aliud ter-
tium, nimirum aliquid rei esse de novo, 
non in re, quae prius erat alba, sed in 
termino, qui de novo factus est albus, 
quem terminum aliquo modo includit seu 
connotat ilIa res, quae est similitudo, 
sub ratione et conceptu si~~itudinis, 
non sub ratione albedinis. 
Suarez is careful to explain that this connotation does not 
reduce predicamental relation to a mere extrinsic denomination. 
The relation is identified with an intrinsic form of the sub-
58 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 23. 
59 Ibid. 
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ject, namely, the absolute foundation, which is relative in so 
far as it connotes something extrinsic in the extrinsic term • 
••• has denoMinationes respectivas, non 
esse mere extrinsecas ••• Unde consequenter 
concedimus, nujusmodi denominationem esse 
ab aliqua forma intrinseca, includendo 
tamen seu connotando aliqua~oaliam extrinse-
cam in extrinseco termino. 
Suarez finds many advantages in this position and many es-
capes from difficulties inextricably interwoven into the woof 
of the other positions. 
We saw previously that he objected strenuously to the dis-
tinction between the ~ ad and the ~ in of a predicamental 
relation. We saw that some philosophers appealed to this real 
dichotomy in order to agree with some texts of Aristotle in 
which the matter seemed to claim that a being suffered no in-
trinsic change upon the advent of a new relation. Some philoM 
sophers explained these texts away by saying that no change took 
place by reason of the formal essence of relation as such, esse 
ad, but only in so far as that predicamental relation also en-
joyed the accidental existence of ~ in. 
For Suarez, the ~ ad and the esse in are not distinct, 
nor could they be. An esse ad which is not in itself either 
substantial or accidental cannot be anything real. No mode of 
being (~ ~) can prescind from being itself. 
60 Ibid. 
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Falsum item est, verum esse ad, posse 
ita praescindi ab esse in, ut illud in-
trinsece non includat ••• modos entis non 
posse ita praescindi ab ente, quin il-
lud in se claudant. 61 
70 
But once Suarez holds the real identification of relation 
and foundation, he can dispense with this distinction. For the 
~ of a relation is not anything other than the esse of the 
foundation. It is the esse of the foundation as connotative of 
a real term. 62 
Also, Suarez finds it a simple matter to agree without 
further distinctions and qualifications with the texts of ArisM 
totle, in which the Stagirite wrote: 
Nor is there motion in respect of rel~­
tion: for it may happen that when one 
correlative changes, the other, although 
this does not itself change, is no longer 
applicable, so that in ~hese cases the 
motion is accidental. 6 
Suarez believes that all positions othe~ than his own would in 
the last analysis be forced to disagree with Aristotle. 64 
Nor does he think that his rational distinction forces him 
to say that a predicamental relation is nothing. Though it is 
not really distinct from the foundation, it is rationally dis-
tinct, and this he thinks sufficient to save its reality. 
61 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 24. 
62 Ibra; 
63 Ar!s£otle: The Physics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., Loeb(ITassicai" Library, 1935, V, 225 b 11 ... 14. 
64 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 24. 
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Nam licet relatio non sit aliquid in 
re distinctum ab absolutis, potest esse ~ 
aliquid ratione distlnctum; et ideo non 
sequitur, quod sit simpliciter nihil. 65 
71 
Relation is real because it is identified with a real founda-
tion; its total reality is that of its ~oundation. 
This is. essential for an understanding of Suarez's doctrine. 
for when the relative denomination is said to arise from the 
coexistence of many absolutes without any real addition to the 
subject, it is mot to be understood that the· denomination is 
equally and simultaneously taken from two absolute forms: one 
intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Rather, the denomination re-
quires the coexistence of such forms, but the relation itself 
is taken in each instance from a proper and intrinsic form con-
noting another. 
Sed intelligendum est, illam denomina-
tionem requirere quidem consortium, seu 
coexistentiam talium rerum seu formarum; 
tamen in unoquoque extremo sumi a pro-
pria forma ut respiciente aliam, quae 
ut sic habet rationem relatlonis, quam-
vis in re non sit alia ab ipsa forma ab-
soluta. 66 
If the foundation is not real, then the relation consequent upon 
that foundation is not real, but only an extrinsic denomination 
or a rational relation. 67 
But still another question arises concerning the foundation 
of a relation. Is the foundation really the same as what Suarez 
~Ibid. 
66 iDfd-:- J n. 25. 
67 Ibrcf~~ 
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callS the ratio fundandi? This latter term is untranslatable 
.. 
because of the various senses in which it is used. As we shall 
see, sometimes it is a cause, other times it means nothing more 
than a condition; in several passages it is found to be iden-
tified with the foundation, while in others it is really dis-
tinct. Because of these difficulties we shall keep the term in 
its original form. 
It would seem, at first, that the foundation and ratio 
fundandi are the same; the foundation of a relation is nothing 
other than that by which the relation can modify its subject. 
But this fundament would then be the ratio fundandi, the reason 
for founding and receiving the relation. They would seem to be 
identical. 
Est autem causa dubltandi, quia funda-
mentum rele.tionis nihil aliud esse vi-
detur quam id quo mediante relatio con-
venit subjecto; sed hoc ipsum funda" 
mentum est ratio fundandi seu recipien-
di relationem; ergo haec non distin-
guuntur. 68 
However, some authors would have it that the two would be 
distinct, and that the ratio fundandi would be some requisite 
either in the fundament or in the extrinsic term. Thus, as in 
the relation of paternity, the generative act is neoessary, even 
though it is not the foundation. Suarez argues that it could 
not be the foundation which is always in the subject. The gener 
68 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 10. 
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~tive act as a strict action is not in the agent, but in the 
.. 
patient, the son who is generated. In this instance, the 
generative act would be the ratio fundandi, even though it is 
not the foundation of the relation. 
Ut ad relationem paternitatis necessaria 
est actio generandi, quae non est fun-
damentum, quia paternitas non habet ab 
illa entitatem suam", cum actio generan-
di sit in filio genito, paternitas vero 9 
sit in patrej est ergo ratio fundandi. 6 
There seems to be a good deal of confusion on this point in 
many authors, but Suarez finds the truth of the matter quite 
obvious upon simple analysis. In every real relation there is 
required on the part of the subject, something which is apt and 
proportioned to found the reference to some other being. This 
is called the foundation of the relation. 
In omni ergo relatione reali requiritur 
ex parte subjecti res aliqua, natura sua 
apta et accomodata ut fundare possit re-
spectum ad aliud, ut ab illa proxime 
habeat relatio realitatem suam, ••• Hujus-
modi ergo res proprie appellatur funda-
mentum relat;8nis in quocunque relatio-
num genere. 
Now it happens that in some relations over and above this 
foundation some other condition is required to mediate between 
the foundation and term, in some way distinct from both of them, 
which will allow the relation to result. 
69 Ibid., n. 11. 
70 Ibid., n. 12. 
Contingit ••• in aliquibus relationibus, 
ut praeter totam entitatem subjecti et 
fundamenti requiratur ali qua alia con-
ditio medians inter fundamentum et ter-
minum, in re ipsa aliquo modo distincta 
ab ipsis, ut possit inter ea consurgere 
relatio. 7~ 
.. 
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This necessary condition is the generative act in the relation 
of paternity. If a person were created immediately and entire w 
1y by God as the sole efficient cause, no real relation of pa-
ternity would arise. And yet this generative act is not strict-
ly the foundation, which Suarez describes as illud in quo et 
a quo proxime habet entitatem suam. 72 
---
This necessary condition, for lack of a better name, is 
frequently called the ratio fundandi of the relation. Suarez 
admits that the choice of words is not too fortunate, 73 for 
ordinarily the term ratio is saved for something which exerts 
some kind of causal influence on the being in question. But 
this necessary condition is a pure condition, removens prohibens, 
and has no causal influence on the relation. 
Suarez warns us that this is not to be ta.ken as a general 
rule to be applied univocally to all relations. Many founda-
tions contain within themselves the very ratio fundandi of the 
relation and are in need of no. other necessary condi tion other 
than themselves and a real term. 
71 Ibid. 
72 IOfa: 
73 . Ibid; 
Naminter duo alba statim consurgit re-
latio similitudinis, a quocunque facta • 
sint, et ubicunque existant, aut quas-
cunque alias conditiones habeant, et 
idem est de relatione scientiae ad sci-
bile et similibus. Et ita hujusmodi ra-
tio fundandi, etiamsi hac voce illam 
conditionem appellemus, non est neces-
saria in omnibus relationibus. 74 
75 
Suarez in order to avoid multiplying terms needlessly pre-
fers to take ratio fundandi as the formal aspect of the founda-
tion, that natural property or nature of the foundation that 
makes it apt to found the relation. In this sense he concludes 
75 that there must be a ratio fundandi in every foundation. 
The ratio and the foundation would not be really distinct, but 
only rationally ao. 76 
TERM OF A RELATION 
The third and last elements of a relation is its term, the 
being which terminates the relation and to which the subject is 
referred. Every predicamental relation demands a real term. 
Dicendum ••• est, ad relationem praedica-
mentllem necessarium esse aliquem ter-
minum realem ••• · Cum enim essentia ejus 
sit ad aliud se habere secundum suum 
esse essentiale, in hoc ipso includitur 
terminus; cumque relatio haec praedica-
mentalis et realis sit, terminum ejus 
realem esse necesse est. 77 
Since the essence of a predicamental relation is ad aliud se 
74 Ibid., n. 13. 
75 Thid-;, n. 14. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 1. 
76 
hB.bere, 78 the term, the aliud, is in some way included in the 
.. 
relation. If the relation is real, then the term also must be 
real. 
But need the term be not only real, but also actually exis 
ing independently of the mind? As Suarez showed above, such an. 
actually existing term is not needed in the case of transcenden-
tal relations, which can be had either to pure possibles or even 
to rationate beings. What, then, is the peculiar nature of a 
predicamental relation that Suarez should demand that it enjoy 
an actually existing term? One reason for calling the matter 
in question is that just considering the relation and the term 
of the relation precisely under its terminating function, the 
relation does not seem to require any actual existence of the 
term. The relation takes its entity from its foundation. 79 
So if there is an actual foundation, this would seem to suffice; 
no actual term would be needed. 
In spite of these difficulties Suarez demands a real term 
actually existing independently of the mind for every real pre-
dicamental relation. ~e admits, as we said previously, that a 
transcendental relation does no~ have this same exigency, and 
its term can either be a real being which can exist, but actual-
ly does not, or even a rationate being. 
78 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 2. 
79 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 2. 
••• relationes reales transcendentales, 
esse posse ad terminos non solum non 
eXistentes, verum etiam qui non sint 
entia realia secundum essentiam. 80 
77 
The difficulty in proving the necessity of an actual term 
is that practically all the arguments that are ~sually brought 
forward to prove this point should logically also apply to tran-
scendental relations. To say, for example, that no real being 
includes in its notion a reference to a being which is not real, 
is not true in a real transcendental relation; or to claim that 
since a relation is always had between two terms, those terms 
must be real if the relation is to be real, and must be actual 
if the relation is to be actual, leaves us in the same difficul-
ty regarding transcendental relations. 81 
On our quest, however, for arguments which will hold and 
prove only for predicamental relations, we find this quotation 
from Suarez: 
••• relatio et terminus sunt simul tem-
pore, et quod ablato correlativo seu 
termino aufertur relatio, et quod posi-
to termino, si iam supponitur fundamen-
tum, consurgit relatio; ••• omnia vero 
illa supponunt realem existentiam ter-
mini, nam includunt coexistentiam ex-
tremorum, ~uae supponit utriusque exis-
tentiam. 8 
Another sturdy proof is this: a predicamental relation 
------------------
80 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 4. 
81 Ibid., n. 5. 
82 Ibid., n. 7. 
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consists essentially in a pure reference to the term# and exer-
cises no o~her function. It is not of itself intended by nature 
or by any agent, but results over and above what the thing is 
in itself according to its complete absolute nature. From this 
explanation it is clear that such a total reference could not be 
had without the coexistence of the two terms# the foundation 
and the term of the relation. Without the term, the foundation 
would remain in every respect an absolute. It is only because 
of the simultaneity of term that the referential aspect of the 
foundation can be justified • 
••• si relatio praedicamentalis in re non 
est aliud nisi ipsummet fundamentum, ut 
accidentaliter dans denominationem rela-
tivam, ergo non potest in re ipsa dare il-
lam, nisi coexistente termino; nam omnis 
alia denominatio aut erit omnino absoluta 
et essentialis, et consequenter ad summum 
erit respectiva transcendentaliter, aut 
non erit denominatio ex solis ipsis rebus 
sumpta, ~~d ex comparatione nostrae ra-
tionis. 
These two arguments are valid even for those who place 
some kind of real distinction between rela'tion and foundation, 
but in the Suarezian pOSition they have even greater force. For 
if the predicamental relation is not really anything other than 
the foundation itself, viewed as relative or referred to a term, 
the foundation cannot really enjoy that denomination unless the 
term is actually existing. For every other denomination either 
83 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 7. 
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.ould be absolute and essential, or would arise merely as a re-
.. 
suIt of a mental comparison. Thus every predicamental relation 
does demand a real term which is actually existing. 84 
The arguments that are frequently brought to bear than an 
sctual term is not necessary, are really valid only against the 
actuality of the term of a transcendental relation. An actual 
term is needed in a predicamental relation precisely because it 
is a pure reference which arises upon the coexistence of the 
terms of that relationship. So though it is true that an actual 
termination does not add anything in the line of perfection to 
the already existing term, nevertheless, the relation does pre-
suppose that term as its object towards which it tends. 
o •• terminum realem requiri ad relationem 
praedicamentalem ex natura et modo talis 
relationis, quae solum consistit in puro 
respectu orto ex coexistentia extremorum. 
Unde, licet verum,sit ipsam actualem ter-
minationem nihil ponere in termino, tamen 
necessario supponet entitatem in illo, ac-
comodatam ut vx positione ejus cum termi-
no possit insurgere relatio, et ut ipsa 
relatio habeat quasi objectum in quod pos-
respicere. 85 
But to return to a point we by-passed earlier. Suarez has 
already implied that the term is somehow of the essence of a re-
lation. Not all the authors are in agreement with him; in 
fact, some are almost violent in their denials. Their reason 
is that since the term is entirely outside of the relation and 
84 Ibid., n. 7. 
85 I'bYd:, n. 8. 
> 
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really distinct from it, it could not possibly be of its es-
.. 
Bence. Ehat is of the essence of a being must be intrinsic to 
it. 86 others claim just the opposite: the term is of the es-
sence of a relation, since the entire essence is an ordination 
to that term. 
The dispute arises only through a confusion in terminology. 
Everyone agrees that the term is not an intrinsic part, either 
as a genus or specific difference, of a relation. So the term 
cannot be of the essence of a relation in this sense. 
But at the same time a relation is a tendency or reference 
to a definite term; this is its essence. So the term can in 
some way be said to be included in the essence of the relation, 
in the sense that the relation cannot be had without the term, 
nor strictly, even be conceived without in some way including 
the term within that concept. 
Unde ••• dici potest includere aliquo 
modo terminum in sua essentia, quia 
non potest absolvi ab illo, neque 
secundum propriam rationem concipi, 
quin in tali conceptu terminus in-
cludatur. 87 
To a certain extent this is true even of transcendental re-
lations, for the forms or entities from whose essence they 
spring cannot be defined adequately without including the term 
------- -----
86 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 9. 
87 Ibfd.-._, no 10. 
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to which they are related. 88 But for Suarez the difference 
between the two is that a predicamental relation from its proper 
and peculiar essence requires an actually eXisting term; a 
transcendental relation does not result from its term, properly 
speaking, nor does it view that term precisely under the formal 
aspect of term, but always in some way as an object, effect, 
cause, 89 etc. Therefore, Suarez can write, 
Atque ita est aliquo modo magis intrin-
seca et formalis habitudo ad terminum, 
praesertim existentem, in relatione prae-
dicamenta~b quam in respectu transcen-
dentali. 
Suarez insists that the necessity of this term is absolute. 
Nihilominus tamen dicendum est non posse 
per ullam potentiam conservari relationem 
praedicamentalem ut sic sine suo actuali 
termino. ~l. 
The reason is that a term is somehow involved in the very formal 
effect of a predicamental relation. Since a predicamental re-
lation cannot actually exist without exercising its formal ef-
fect, and the formal effect includes a real and actual term, 
then the relation demands with absolute necssity that actual 
term. No formal effect can ever be had unless all its essential 
prerequisites are also given • 
••• non posse relationem conservari in 
rerum natura, quin actu exerceat suum 
88 Ibid., no 12. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid~ 
91 Ibfd'-, n. 13. 
effectum formalem; ergo non poteet 
relatio actu conservari sine suo ter~ 
mino actuali •. 92 
It is much easier to see how this term is necessary in the 
suarezian position which identifies the relation with the foun-
dation. Without the coexistence of the term, the relative de-
nomination would not be had, but only the absolute foundation 
with its absolute denomination. So there is no question here 
of how God can conserve one entity without also conserving some 
other entity really distinct from the first. For God can and 
does conserve the foundation in existence without any other 
term. But He cannot conserve that foundation under its relative 
aspect and denomination without an actual term, for the very 
relative aspect of the foundation includes and involves the ter~ 
Nulla enim hic intervenit entitas, quam 
Deus non possit conservare sine alia 
realiter distincta; nam totam entita-
tem fundamenti potest conservare sine 
termino; non tamen potest conservare 
illam entitatem sub tali ratione et de-
nominatione, quia secundum illam in-
volvit ipsum terminum; imo in re ipsa 
nihil distinctum addlt, praeter coexis-
tentiam termini. 93 
This actual term of a relation must be really distinct from 
the foundation of the relation, and so from the relation itself, 
which is really identified with the foundation.' 
Dicendum vero est, ad relationem realem 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., n. 14. 
necessarium esse ut fundamentum, et ter-
minus formaliter sumptus, in re ipsa dis-
~ tinguantur. 94 
Suarez thinks that the truth of this statement is evident. 
Et quod requiratur aliqua distinctio in 
re inter correlativa realia est fereggrin-
cipium per se notum in metaphysica. 
83 
But if anyone demands proof for this statement, several 
spring immed1a.tely from the metaphysical scene. 
In mutual real relations the two relations are really dis-
tinct from one another, otherwise, they would be but two aspects 
of one real relation. But each of these relations is identical 
with one of tpe terms, since a relation is not really distinct 
from its foundation. What is the foundation of one relation 
will be the term of the other, and vice versa. Therefore, if 
one relation is distinct from the other, and the other relation 
is identified with its own foundation, then, the first relation 
will be really distinct from the foundation of the other, but 
will have it as its term. Thus, it is clear the relation would 
be distinct from its term. 
Nam correlativa censentur realiter opposi-
ta; non opponitur autem idem sibi ipsi; 
oportet ergo ut correlativa in re aliquo 
modo distinguantur. Unde necesse etiam 
est relationes reales oppositas, esse in 
re aliquo modo distinctas, tum propter op-
positionem, tum etiam quia unaquaeque re-
94 Ibid., d. 47, s. 9, n. 3. 
95 Ibid. 
latio in re est idem cum suo extremo; 
••• ergo si extrema sint distincta, 
etiam relationes. Quocirca si rela-
tionis terminus est relatio opposita, 
hinc satis concluditur relationem et 
terminum deb ere in re esse distincta. 96 
84 
.. 
Also, not merely the two mutual relations should be really 
distinct, but also the subjects of those relations; for a real 
relation cannot be had between terms which are not distinct. 
For if there were really one, they would become two terms only 
because of the intellect separating and comparing them, and the 
consequent relations would be rational, not real. 97 
Suarez says this real distinction between relation and 
term, between foundation and term, need not be adequate, as 
between two separate and separable things, but a modal or an 
inadequate distinction, as between a whole and its part, would 
be sufficient to maintain a real relation. 
Breviter tamen censeo non esse neces-
sarium aequalem in omnibus, sed juxta 
naturam fundamentorum et modum rela-
tionum pensandum id esse •••• Saepe enim 
haec distinctio debet esse realis et 
suppositalis, ut in relatione patris 
et filii; ••• Ad aliquas vero relationes 
existimo sufficere distinctionem modalem; 
nam, sicut est vero efficientia aut emana-
tio inter rem et mcdum, ita etiam potest 
esse vera relatio. 98 
The final question that arises regarding the term of a 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ib1d7, n. 4. 
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predicamental relation is wh.ether the term is the being to which 
• 
the subject is referred under its absolute nature, or in so far 
as that being is relative. The point is cardinal for a thorough 
understanding of our problem • 
••• est per se valde necessaria ad expli-
candam naturam relationis, -quae tum ex 
fundamento~ tum ex termino, suo modo 
pendet... 9 
Suarez is speaking of the particular aspect of the term which 
is necessary to terminate a relation. 
Est autem advertendum, hic nos non agere 
de formali denominatione termini, ut actu 
terminantis, sed de ratione seu forma, 
quae in ipsa re, quae est terminus, rr-
quiritur ut sit apta ad terminandum. 00 
There are, in general, three schools of thought on this 
subject. The first group, with Cajetan as their leader, 101 
maintain that in every relation ~he formal term ought to be 
relative. 
Prima affirmat in omnibus relationibus, 
tam mutuis quam non mutuis, formalem ter-
mlnum debere esse relativum. lOa 
The second school comes forward with Ferrara 103 to de-
mand a distinction. In mutual relations the term is relative, 
while in relations which are not mutual, the term terminates 
99 Ibid., d. 47, s. 16, n. 1. 
100 Ioid., n. 2. 
101 CiJetan, Commentarium in Summam Theologicam, I, q. 13, a. 7. 
lOa Suarez, d. 47, s. 16, ii":" 3. -
103 Sylvester de Ferrara, Commentarium in Summam contra Gentile~ 
II, c. 11. --
rr 
, under its absolute aspect. 
Secunda sententia distinctione utitur, 
nam de relationibua mutuis idem sentit 
quod praecedens sententia ••• De non 
mutuis autem affirmat termini~i ad ab-
solutum et non relativum ••• u4 
86 
The third opinion, advanced by such men as Scotus 105 and 
capreolus,106 contends that all relations, mutual as well as 
non-mutual, terminate at an absolute. 
Tertia sententia universaliter docet 
omnes relationes, t~n mutuas quam non 
mutuas~ terminari ad absolutum formali-
ter. lu7 
Suarez himself decides to join forces with the third group 
to hold that all relations terminate at an absolute. 108 He 
divides his proof into two sections: the first, for nonwmutual 
relations, the second for mutual relations. 
In non-mutual relations the real term cannot be another re-
lation, corresponding to the first, but must be the absolute 
entity, or an absolute property of the term. 
Dico ergo primo: in relativis non mu-
tuia ratio quae est in uno extremo ad 
terminandam relationem alterius, non 
est a11qua relatio opposita relationi 
alterius, sed est ipsa terminus, vel 
proprietas aliqua absoluta talis ter-
mini. 109 
- -"- - .--------
104 SU8.rez, d. 47, s. 16, n. 4. 
105 Scotus, Commentarium in Librum Sententiarum, I, d. 36, q. 1. 
106 Capreo1us, Commentarium in Summam Theologicam, I, a. a, ad ~ 
107 Suarez, d. 47, s. 16, n. 5. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid:, n. 6. 
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Tn8 proof is obvious, for in non-mutual relations the r~al re-
lation has a real and actual term which is not the basis or 
foundation for another relation. Therefore, the term cannot 
terminate under a real relative aspect, since it simply does 
not possess one; it must terminate in so far as it is an s.bso-
••• haec relatio habet terminum realem et 
realiter existentem; sed in illo termino 
nulla existit re1atio rea1is correspondens 
opposita alteri relationi; ergo il1e ter-
minus non per relationem sed per aliquam 
rem absolutam constituitur aptius ad ter-
minandum. 110 . 
As regards mutual relations, Suarez offers several proofs, 
from which we shall briefly consider two. III In a pair of 
mutual relations each relation terminates at the foundation of 
the other in so far as it is an absolute, for even, imagining 
the impossible, if one of the two relations was withheld, if 
the foundation were still intact, the first relation could still 
fully terminate at that foundation • 
••• nam si per impossibile in a1tero ex-
tremo impediretur relatio, conservato 
toto fundamento ejus, nihilominus re1a-
tio a1terius extremi posset ad 111ud 
terminari; ergo signum est i119s duas 
relationes esse simul per concomitan-
tiam, et non per forma1em terminum unius 
ad a1iam. lla 
Suarez bases his second proof on an analysis of the philo-
110 Ibid. 
III Ibid., d • .47, s. 16, n. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 
112 Ibi4,., d. 47, s. 16, n. 16. 
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sophiC axiom which every philosopher admits that given the 
4 
foundation and term, a predicamental relation will reslllt. 
These are the only requirements; no mention is made of any 
other relative or relation. Therefore, Suarez concludes that 
the term of a relation must be an absolute, not a corresponding 
relation. 
Secundo argumentor, quia COMmllne axioma 
est, posito fundamento et termino, resul-
tare relationem praedicamentalem, et non 
alias; ergo terminus unius relationis 
non potest esse relatio opposita. Ante-
cedens certum est omnium consensu, et con-
stat ex supra dictis de natura hujus rela-
tionis. 113 
Thus we have seen with Suarez something of the nature of 
the supreme genus of predicamenta1 relation. But in the con-
crete, there are different kinds of predicamental relations. 
Although all of them are similar in so far as they are a pure 
reference to a term, yet all the various individual predicamen-
tal relations can be sub-divided into three species which fall 
under the general genus we have been considering. 
KINDS OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION 
In determining the various types of relations Suarez once 
again takes his point of departure from Aristotle. In the fifth 
book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds 
of relatives, specifically distinct, according to their three 
113 Ibid., n. 17 • 
. 
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types of foundations. 
Things are 'relative' (1) as double to 
half, and treble to a third, and in gen-
eral that which contains something else 
many times to that which is contained 
many times in something else, and that 
which exceeds to that which is exceeded; 
(2) as that which can heat to that which 
can be heated, and that which can cut to 
that which can be cut, and in general 
the active to the passive; (3) as the 
measurable to the measure, and the know-
able to knowledge, and the perceptible 
to perception. Il~ 
89 
It is obvious why both Aristotle and Suarez chose the 
foundations to be the distinguishing factor, for since the 
foundation .- and it must be remembered that for Suarez relation 
even owes its ontological unity to that foundation -- there 
could be no clearer sign or clue to the distinction of relations 
that the distinction of their formal foundations • 
••• nam cum una ex potissimis causis re-
lationis sit fundamentum ejus, tmo cum 
ab eo habet entitatem suam, nullum po-
test esse majus indicium distinctionis 
relationumi quam distinctio fundamen-torum ••• 1 5 
In brief, Suarez's ar@unent, though he does not put it precisely 
in this way, is this. Relation has its being from its founda-
tion. But being and unity are convertible. Therefore, relation 
has its unity from its foundation. As the species of the foun~ 
dations differ, so differ the species of relations. 
------------
114 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1020 b 26-32. 
115 Suarez, d. "47, s. 10, n. 13. 
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The remote subject of relation is not of equal value in 
determining this distinction, since it is further removed from 
the relation in question. 
Nam fundamentum remotum vel potius sub-
jectum non ita per se concurrit ad rela-
tionem, et ideo distinctio ejus non est 
ita sufficiens fundamentum ad distinguen-
das relationes. 116 
At first consideration, it might have seemed better to dis-
tinguish relations according to their terms, since relations 
are ordination or references to those terms: the term then 
being the specifying factor in each case. Suarez admits that 
this would be true if one is speaking of some basis, even though 
remote, for the distinction of relations. But the fundamental 
and telling distinction had best be taken from something more 
immediately proximate. 
Reapondetur ••• id esse verum de distinc-
tione specifica et ultima; distinctio-
nem vero genericam seu sub alteram, pos-
se aliunde sumi. 117 
Also, the Aristotelian basis of distinction does not com-
pletely overlook the diversity of terms, but in some way in-
cludes them, at least, implicitly. Since the relation is pre-
ciselya reference to another, which other, scl., the term, must 
be real and of such a nature as to terminate the relation, it 
is clear that the nature of the term will in its own right pro-
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibrd'~-, n. 14. 
portionately determine the relation, even if one makes the 
foundation itself the formal determinate. 
Secundo respondetur, in ilIa distinctione 
non esse praetermissos terminos formales, 
sed vel expresse, vel saltem implicite 
significatos esse in illis tribus generi-
bus. 118 
91 
The adequacy of the division Suarez says has never been 
called into question, 119 but we shall take up this in passing 
in the critique in the last chapter. Suarez quotes with approv-
al Alexander of Hales's defense of the three-fold division on 
the ground that they are regulated by the "three universal modes 
of being": identity and diversity, act and potency, the per-
ject and the imperfect. 
Aliam rationem hujus differentiae indicat 
eodem loco Alexander Alensis, dicens illam 
divisionem sumptam esse ex tribus modis 
universalibus entis, qui sunt idem ac di-
versum, quoad primum; potentia et actus, 
quoad secundum; et pel~8ctum et imperfec-
tum, quoad tertium ••• 
The latter division of perfect and imperfect does present dif-
ficulties immediately, for it would seem to be reducible in 
some way to the second category of potency and act, since poten-
cy as a capacity for perfection, implies of its nature a state 
of imperfection, while by act we mean nothing other than perfec-
tion. Suarez also pressed a difficulty that arose in the mind 
118 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 14. 
119 Ibid., n. 15. 
120 !bid~, n. 16. 
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of Alexander of Hales, the Doctor Irrefragabilis. The relation 
existing between sense faculty and its sensible object is not 
as the imperfect to the perfect, but only as that which is 
measurable to that which is the measure, the specifying term, 
which can either be more perfect, equally perfect, or less per-
fect than the sense knowledge. As a consequence of this dif-
ficulty Alexander of Hales stated without proving this three-
fold division as the basis for the division of foundation~. 
Deinde, quamvis asserat illos tres modos 
sufficienter dividere fundamenta relatio-
num, non tamen rationem sufficientiae red-
dit, neque ex vi illius explicationis de-
clarat dis~inctionem eorum inter see 121 
In the last analysis, Suarez harkens back to Aristotle as 
his authority for the divisions of relational foundations and 
leaves the argument there. His distinction is based on authori-
ty, nothing more. Suarez argues that Aristotle must have ar-
rived at such a division from some kind of inductive process by 
which he found that there was no relation that could not be re. 
duced to one of these three heads: 
Existimo ergo nullam aliam rationem suf-
ficientiae Aristotelem habuisse, praeter 
inductionem quamdam, qua intellexit nul-
lam inveniri relationem, quae ad aliquod 
ex dictis capitibus revocari non possit ••• 122 
Suarez's stand remains here; he goes no further, except to jus-
tify his stand with a consideration of the entire gamut of ob-
121 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 16. 
12& Ibid. 
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jections and difficulties, as is his wont, which can be hurled 
at his "divisional" position. 
As we saw above, Suarez places all relations which ulti-
mately stem from unity or multiplicity into his first classifica 
tion of relations, which he later subdivides into various sub-
species. Relations of equality, similarity, and specific iden-
. 
tity are grouped together as having their relational basis in 
unity: things are similar which have one quality; equal which 
have ~ quant:t ty; specifically the same which have one speci-
fic substance or essence: 
•• ~nam in unitate ••• fundari aequalita-
tem, similitudinem, et in universum 
identitatem eorum quorum una est sub-
stantia. Nam similia dicuntur, quae 
habent unam qualitatem; aequalia quae 
habent unam quantitatem; eadem vero, 
quae habent unam substantiam, quod po-
test intelligi vel propria et in rigore 
de substantia, vel generatim de essen-
tia ••• 123 
Other relations are based or founded on number or multi-
plicity: those which are related in quantity, and yet do not 
enjoy a strict unity, such as multiple, excessive, double, tri-
ple, etc.: 
In numero vero ••• fundari omnes relatio-
nes quae aliquo modo secundum quantita-
tem dicuntur, et ab unitate recedunt, 
ut sunt omnes proportiones inter numeros 
inaequales ••• 124 
123 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 2. 
124 Ibid. 
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Relations of dissimilarity, distinction, etc., Suarez also plac 
• r 
under this first heading, for they too are in some way based on 
number, since distinction implies difference, difference implies 
multiplicity, while multiplicity implies unities: 
Atque ••• ad idem fundamentum pertinent re-
lationes omnes dissimilitudinis, distinc-
tionis, et similes, quia in numero aliquo 
modo fundantur; hic enim non sumuntur in 
rigore unitas et numerus pro quantitate, 
sed generalius. 125 
Whenever Aristotle speaks of relations of this type he always 
speaks of them in the plural, for they are always mutual rela-
tions. 126 
In the second group Suarez, following Aristotle, places re-
lations which are founded on an active or passive potency, or 
in actions flowing from them, e.g., the power of heating and 
the power of being heated; actually heating and actually hot: 
In secundo genere ponit Aristoteles ea 
relativa quae fundantur in potentia agen-
di et patiendi, vel in actionibus earum ••• 
Et adhibet exempla, ut calefactivum et 
calefactibile, calefaciens et calefactum. 127 
But Suarez makes two clarifications of Aristotle's position 
in the fifth book of his Metaphysics. First, when Aristotle 
places a real relation between a potency and a possible, he is 
not speaking of a possible effect taken objectively, as some 
125 Ibid., n. 2. 
126 !DIu. 
127 roacr;, n. 3. 
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have thought; rather, he is speaking of a passive potency which 
'" can receive the action. 
o •• cum Aristote1es ponit re1ationem 
rea1em inter potentiam et possibi1e, 
nunquam loqui de effectu possibi1i 
objective sumpto... Aristote1es au-
tem aperte loquitur de potentia pas-
siva seu subjecto cA1efactibi1i ••• 128 
Secondly, it is one thing to be the real term of a relation of 
. 
an active potency, as actually acting or causing efficiently, 
and another to be the term of an active potency, abstracting 
from the action.itse1f. The latter term is a passive potency; 
otherwise, it could not be a. real term. The former is the ef-
fect itself as flowing from the agent • 
••• a1ium esse terminum rea1em re1atio-
nis potentiae activae ut sic abstrahendo 
ab actione, a termino potentiae activae12 ut subest actioni, seu ut facientis... 9 
This relation o,f an active potency as actually acting can be 
had according to differences in time: either in a present ae-
tion, as a builder actually building, to his building; or in a 
past action, as,in the relation of paternity; or even in a 
future action, 
••• hanc relationem, quae fundatur in po-
tentia Bub actione, variari juxta varias 
temporis differentias: alia enim funda-
tur in praesenti actione ••• a1ia in acti-
one praeterita ••• et alia in actione fu-
tura, ut quod facturum est ad id quod 
faciendum ••• 130 
128 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 3. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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The third cla~s or relatives consists in those which are 
.. 
based on some way on "measure," -- mensurabilis ad mensuram, 
as the relation knowledge has to the thing known, or the intel-
lect to its intelligible object. A profound difference is to 
be noted between relations of this third type and ttiose of the 
first two. The first two types of relations imply a mutual re-
lationship; those of the third type are not mutual • 
••• in prioribus ••• utrumque relativum di-
citur ad aliquid, quia idipsum, a quo 
unumquodque est, aliud dicitur, et non 
quia aliud ad ipsum; at vero 1n tertio 
genere, 11cet unum relativorum dicatur 
ad aliquid, quia vere est ad aliud, al-
terum vera, quod il11 correspondet, non 
dicitur ad aliud quia vere sit ad aliud, 
,sed quia aliud est ad ipsum. 131 
Thus in the case of knowledge, knowledge is related to its 
known object, yet the object is said to be known, not because 
it has a real relation to the knowledge, but because the know-
ledge has a real relation to it. 
Relative terms which imply number of po-
tency, therefore, are all relative be-
cause their very essence includes in its 
nature a reference to something else, not 
because something else involves a refer-
ence to it; but tbat which is measurable 
or knowable or thinkable is called rela-
tive because something else involves a 
reference to it. 132 
We have now seen in a general way something of Suarez's in-
sight into the nature of predicamental relations. The task be-
131 Ibid., n. 4. 
132 Aristotle, MetaphYSics, 1021 a 2'7-31. 
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fore us is to stand back and to see this position in metaphysi-
cal perspective in order to evaluate Suarez's stand on this 
basic ontological question. This we shall do in the following 
chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
A CRITIQUE OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON RELATIONS 
We have thus seen through many pages Suarez's ideas on the 
nature of a predicamental relation. Our question now is to 
what extent he is correct in his analysis and in his conclusion 
But any analysis or any sey of conslusions presupooses certain 
philosophical doctrines which act as premises and as a point of 
departure for all the rest of a man's thought. It is ridiculous 
to begin and end merely with some doctrinal fragment, torn from 
the total complex of a philosopher's thought. If he has reason-
ed, B.nd reasoned logically, to certain conclusions on a particu-
lar point, we cannot merely take those conclusions in isolation. 
We must trace them back over the paths of thought to their on-
tological and epistemological sources. It has been said of 
Kant that once one grants him his initial premises, one must 
also agree with him on the total remainder of his critical en-
terprise. 1 To a certain extent this is true of every philo-
sopher. Give Aristotle act and potency and he will explain the 
world. 2 Grant St. Thomas creation and he will explain the 
universe. 3 This is obvious hyperbole, but I have put it with 
-- -------- -------
1 N~rman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure 
~eason," Macmillan-and Co., Lonuon, 1930, Intr., xxx-rir:--
aVj. D. Ross, Aristotle, Methuen and Co., London, 1937, 81. 
3 Etienne Gilson, The Stirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, transl. 
by A. H. C. Downes, C arles-Scrlbner's Sons, New York, 1940, 
64 ... 65. 
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deliberate provocativeness in order to emphasize the point I 
am trying to make. To understand and accept or reject Suarez's 
doctrine on relations, we must understand and equally accept 
or reject his first metaphysical beginnings. 
But we shall not start from those beginnings; we shall 
not begin with the concept of being and watch its unravelling 
in one direction until it unfolds in an explanation of predica-
mental relation. Rather, we shall begin with relation and trace 
it back to its source in being. 
As we stated in our intromlction, our principal concern in 
this last chapter is with ontological truth: not what Aristotle 
said, not what St. Thomas or Suarez held merely because they 
held such positions; but what does reason itself say in think-
ing out reality. 
If we begin with the problem of relation itself, it is es-
sential that we see it precisely as a problem. A solution is 
no solution at all unless we clearly grasp the problem to which 
it is a solution. 
The core of our present problem is this: we know with full 
certitude that the various ebings which constitute reality are 
inter-related. They are really related to each other. Now 
what causes them to be related? in virtue of what can we say 
that two belngs are really similar, that one being is really de-
r,--------------~ 100 
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pendent upon another, that a father is really related to his 
.. 
son and the son to his father? If they are really related, 
what makes them related? The answer is real relations. 
Thus far there is no difficulty_ The difficulty arises 
when we seek the intimate nature and explanation of those real 
relations. ~n explaining their nature, we must not explain 
them in such a way as to destroy either their reality or their 
relativity. In, the two possible courses open to us, we find 
that one of the two elements would seem to be weakened. If we 
emphasize the reality of relations by plaving a real distinc-
tion between them and their foundations, then there is the dan-
ger of making them absolutes, entities with their own act of 
existence, super-added to the absolute quantified, qualified 
substance. A relation becomes another aliquid, rather than an 
ad ali quid, the least of the intrinsic predicaments as regards 
entity. Thus in affirming their reality, we seem to weaken, if 
not destroy, their relativity. 
But if we take the second course open to us, and emphasize 
the utter and radical relativity of relations by claiming a 
rational distinction between relation and foundation, with re-
lation being a mere fragile connotation, the least of the pre-
dicaments, we seem to destray the reality of relations by mak-
ing them merely rationate beings. 
This is our antinomy; this our problem: to keep relations 
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real and relational. With the problem in hand, let us work 
----
.. 
toward a solution. 
Predicamental relations are real; 4 they have their reali-
ty of themselves. Independently of the mind things are really 
related among themselves. These relations are not of the es-
sences of things, which are absolutes, but are really added to 
the absolutes as real accidents. Each relation, as an intrin-
sic accident, is a principle of being, an ens entis. 5 In so 
far as that being is an accident, its existence will be that 
of accidental existence: iness~, -- for in every being there 
is a proper proportion between its essence and its act of exis-
tence. 
• •• in aliis autem relationibus in crea-
turis existentibus, est aliud esse re-
lationis et substantiae quae refertur, 
et ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum 
quod insunt compositionem faciunt ad 
subjectum ••• 6 
In so far as it is a finite being, it will not have its act of 
ancidental existence from its very essence, but will be a being 
composed of two really distinct principles, essence and exis-
tence. Any finite being, whether substance or accident, is a 
composite of essence and existence. The essence of any crea-
ture, adequately conceived, does not include existence within 
its formal content. To know existence an analysis of essence 
------.----
4 Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9. 
5 De Ver., q. ''Z7;-a. 1, ad 8. 
6 ~~n~~, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. 
rl----------------------____________ ~ 
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is not enough; one must proceed to a completely new act, the 
.. 
judgment, where the act of existence is formally known and af-
,firmed. 
Esse enim subsistens, non potest esse 
nisi unum... Oportet ergo, quod quae-
libet alia res sit ens participative, 
ita quod aliud sit in eo substantia 
partlcipans esse et aliud ipsum esse 
participatum. 7 
This applies to any finite being. The essence of a relation is 
that by which it is what it is. But a relation in the order of 
essence totally consists in a reference to another: ad aliquid 
or esse ad. 
Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid signi-
ficant secundum propriam rationem solum 
respectum ad a11ud. 8 
Therefore, the essence of a relation can be expressed as esse 
ad. The existence of predicamental relation is that by which 
it is. But the existence of any accident is to be in a subject: 
esse in. 9 Predicamental relation is an accident. Therefore, 
the existence of a predicamental relation will be to inhere in 
a subject: ~ in. 
Et similiter licet ad allquid non signl-
ficetur ut inhae~ens, tamen oportet ut 
sit inhaerens. 10 
Thus, every real predicamental relation will be composed of 
these two elements: esse ad and esse in. 
Dicendum quod ipsa relatio quae nihil est 
7 ~odl., III, a. 20. 
8 S. T., I, q. 28, a. 1. 
9 In V--Meta., lect. 9, n. 894; lect. 22, n. 1139. 
10 ag P~ti;-q. 8. a. 2. 
aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad 
aliam, aliud habet in quantum est 
accidens, et aliud in quantum est 
relatio vel ordo. In quantum ac-
cidens est, habet quod sit in sub-
jecto, non autem in quantum est re-
latio vel ordo; sed solum quod ad 
aliud sit quasi in aliud transiens, 
et quodammodo rei relatae assistens. 
Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens, 
licet non ex hoc ipso quod est rela .. 
tio. l~ 
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There are some Thomists who, while maintaining a real dis-
tinction between finite essence and existence, wtill hold that 
the essence of a real predicamental relation contains two as-
pects of one reality which is the relation itself: the esse ad 
and the esse in. They claim that since relation, unlike the 
other accidents, does not of its nature commit itself to be 
either real or rational, 12 the essence of a relation becomes 
real by including within itself the note of inherence, esse in. 
For, as Cardinal Billot writes, 
Sed cave ne concipias haec duo tamquam 
se habentia ad invicem eo modo quo po-
tentia se habet ad actum, puta essen-
tia ad esse, non secus ac si esse ad 
significaret essentiam relationis re-
alis, et esse in ejus existentiam. Hoc 
enim verum-non-est, quia esse aliquid 
cui competit existere in subjecto, pro-
fecto ingreditur essentiam relationis 
realis in quantum realis est.... Unde 
consulto dixi distinguendas esse duas 
notas id esse duos inadequatos aspec-
tUB unius simplicia atque incompoaitae 
11 Ibid., q. 7, a. 9, ad 7. 
12guodl., IX, 4. 
• 
essentiae realis, quae tota est ad et 
tota in, tametsi, conceptus ad, ex hoc 
quod QIcit ad, non involvit conceptum 
in, qui solus est ratio realitatis in 
TIs quae dicuntur ad alterum. Quippe 
esse ad non explicat rationem entis 
realiB; nisi quia et in quantum est in 
sUbstantia vel per inhaerentiam vel 
per identitatem. 13 
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13 L. Card. Billot, S.J., De Deo Uno et Trino, Commentarius in 
Primam Partem S. Thomae-,-ea:-7a;-in-Univ. Gregoriana, Romae, 
1926, 409. Some Thomists 'who tenaciously hold the real dis-
tinction between finite ess·ence and existence quote Card. 
Billot on this point with approval. It is because they con-
ceive of relation as really distinct from the foundation, 
but as not adding any new entitative perfection to the sub-
ject. The clearest and most detailed exposition of this 
view has been presented in, an historical study of "St. Thom-
as's Theory of the Causes of Relation," by Clifford G. Kos-
sel, in The Modern Schoolman, st. Loui's Univ., St. Louis, 
NOv., 1946, 19.-36; Jan. 1947, 93-107; March 1948, 151-172. 
In the course of these articles Kossel writes: 
First, granted the existence of the subject 
with the foundation of relation (in this case 
quantity), the subject acquires a new rela-
tion without intrinsic addition or change. 
Secondly, before there is an actual relation, 
the subject by its foundation has an indeter-
minate and virtual relativity. This is the 
root and esse of the relation; by the pos-
session or-tnis quantity, I am capable of be-
ing equal to all who have the same quantity. 
Thirdly, the actual relation arises when there 
is a term which determines this indeterminate 
relativity of the root. Finally, the real 
esse of relation, and hence its reality as an 
Innerent accident, derives from the root and 
is entirely independent of the term in its 
being. (March 1948, 158) 
According to this explanation there is but one'physical form 
which is the source of quantity, the virtual relativity, and 
relation in act. (158) This is not explicitly, at least, 
the same as Suarez's doctrine. With Suarez, relation is 
only rationally distinct from the foundation; in the Bil-
lot-Kossel theory, relation is really distinct from the 
foundation, but is not a new physical form added over and 
above the foundation. Suarez's position logically leads to 
the conclusion that predicamental relation is only funda-
mentally in things, formally in the mind; for the second 
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I do not believe that this is correct. It is not necessary 
.. 
-_.- -------
school, predicamental relation is formally in reality, but 
is nothing other than the simultaneous coexistence in being 
and intelligibility of the two terms of the relation. This 
unity of the two is real although it does not add anything 
entitatively to either of the terms. This real unity can 
be grasped and forged into a concept by an act of compari-
son of the two real terms and uniting them within one spe-
cies. 
In this explanation, however, it would seem that every 
relation would be mutual, for if the relation itself is the 
unity of the two, then, if one subject is related to the 
other, then the other partaking equally in the unity of 
simultaneity and existence would also be really related to 
the first subject. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
proponents of this theory would admit a real mutual predica-
mental relation between God and creature, for example, or 
between an act of knowledge and its material object. (I do 
not say formal object, since the relation would be tran-
scendental of faculty and nature of act to its formal ob-
ject, but intend merely anything that would fall- under the 
general formal object and would not specify the faculty or 
nature of the act in question.) 
Although this theory does not appeal explicitly to a 
connotation of subject to term as an explanation of relatio~ 
and so explicitly avoids the difficulties pressing against 
Suarez's theory, nevertheless, it still must face the dif. 
ficulty of explaining how this accident of relation does 
not seem to inhere in any particular subject and yet par-
takes of the nature of accident; it would seem to differ 
very little from the examples of the day which Plato appeals 
to in his Parmenides (131 B 4-7) in attempting to explain 
the participation of individuals in the forms. There does 
not seem to be any reason for saying it is any more an ac-
cident of one being than it is an accident of another, un-
less one would appeal to the Suarezian connotation. And 
while Billot-Kossel hold that it is in a subject only in so 
far as the foundation is in the subject, since the actuali-
ty of relation does not add any new entitative perfection 
to the subject over and above that of the foundation, it 
would seem that the only accidental perfection really dis-
tinct from the subject would be the foundation. This# how-
ever, is admittedly an absolute. nence, the distinction 
between foundation and relation would seem to coincide with 
the rational distinction posited by Suarez, and the rela-
tive entity would be destroyed by a real identity with an 
absolute. 
r __ --------------------------------~ 
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to include esse in within thelssence of a pred.icamenta1 re1a-
• 
tion to make it real. 14 Relillon of itself can be either real 
or rational depending on wbetMr or not the foundat:i on is real 
15 
of rational. But though tlliconcept of relation as such 
does not imply a real or r~bQ reference, it is not neces-
sary to go outside the essenclof predicamenta1 relation to find 
the reality of any particulanll.1 relation. Relation as such 
is an analogous concept to be!~plied analogously to real re1a-
t.ions and rational relatioTIS 1lccidenta1 and divine relations .16 
14 
15 
16 
F. X. Maquart, ElementaJ~ll()sophiae, Andreas Blot, Paris, 
1938, 186-187. . _. 
Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 2B1i.l; de Pot., q. 7, a. 11. 
SUrdl., IX, 4. "SciendUJut quodi"i11iOc differt "ad Qli~: 
qu (il'"ab aliis generibus 1100. alia genera ex propria sui 
ratione habent quod aliqullsint; sicut quantitas ex hoc 
ipso quod est quantitas Bl!~Qid ponit; et similiter est 
de aliis; sed "ad ali~Wex propria sui §eneris ratione 
non habet quod est aliqllj~, sed" ad ali quid ; unde lnveni-
untur quaedam "ad aliquidl~Qae nihil sunt in rerum natura, 
sed in ratione tantum; qullin allis generibus non contin ... 
gi t: et quamvis "a.d aliquEI ex ratione sui generia non 
habeat quod ponat aliquid; non tamen etis.m habet ex ipsa 
generis ratione quod nih.il~mat; quia ,sic nulla re1atio 
esset aliquld in rerum n8:~a; unde "ad aliquid" non esset 
unum de decem generibus. 1I 
The analogy of the cl~~ept of relation as auch can be 
drawn from the ideas prelilt in this paragraph. 1) Relation 
as such, unlike the othertpedicaments, can be either real 
or rational; some relat11~i exist independently of the 
mind, other exist only In:ne mind. 2) But to exi at in the 
mind is not the same as~uist in reality,. for a real be-
ing enjoys real existence1i rationate being enjoys inten-
tional existence. "Specb~telligibi1is est simi1itudo 
ipsius essentiae rei et er,podammodo ipsa quidditas et na-
tura rei secundum esse intllligibi1e, non secundum esse na-
turale prout est in rebus,' Quod1., VIII, a. 4. Therefore, 
the concept of relation wtlnapplied to real and rational 
relations is applied partljin the same sense, partly in a 
different sense. The ~ III~id or esse ad is common to 
both types of relation, bmtheir respective acts of exis-
tence differ. Thus, relatlln is an analogous concept. 
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Predicamental relation is real from its essence and from that 
.. 
essence implies a proportion to the existence of an accident, 
inesse. 17 To claim that the actual existence is contained 
within the essence of a predicamental relation is to deny, in 
at least one instance, -- and therefore, why not in every in-
stance? -- the real distinction between finite essence and exi8-
tence. 
This position would seem in the last analysis, as we have 
indicated in a previous note, to be reducible to that of Suarez. 
If the reference to a term (~_ ~d) is identified with the 
reference to the subject (!!~~ in), then the complete and essen-
tial relativity of relation, cuJus totum ~~ ~st ad aliud se 
habere, 18 would seem to be destroyed. 
The essence, ~ ad, of the predicamental relation is 
really distinct from the essence of the foundation. The foun-
dation of any relation is always an absolute, 19 for no rela-
tion can be the ba.sis or foundation of another relation. 
Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes ip-
sae non referuntur ad aliud per aliam re~ 
lationem sed per se i~5as, quia essentiali-
ter relationes sunt. . 
The reason fo~ this is obvious. If the total essence of a re-
lation is an ordination to another, then it does not require 
17 Summa contra Gentiles, IV, c. 14, ad 9. 
18 Jonn" of st. Thomas, Oursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Mari-
etti, Taurini, 1930. Vol. I, Log. II, P.Q~ XVII, art a, 579. 
19 Ibid., 591 b 10. 
20 De Pot!., q. 7, a. 9, ad 2. 
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any other relation to make it relative. Of its nature it is 
referential; another relation added to this would be superflu-
ous and would lead us into an infinite series: 
Nec iterum una relatio refertur ad ali-
am per aliquam aliam relationem, cum 
enim dioimus quod~paternitas opponitur 
filiationi oppositio non est relatio 
media inter paternitatem et filiatio-
nem. Quia utroque modo r~latio multi-
plioaretur in infinitum • 
. 
So if the essenoe of every foundation is an absolute, while 
the essenoe of every predicamental relation is not in any sense 
absolute, but entirely relational, then it follows that the es-
senoe of the foundation and hhe essenoe of a relation cannot be 
really identified, but must be really distinot. 22 
Nor oan the act of existence of a predioamental relation 
be identified with the act of existence of the foundation. For 
in every being a proportion is set up between the two prinoi-
pIes of being, essenoe and existenoe. 23 If two essenoes are 
radioally different, their respective acts of existenoe will 
also be different. 24 Since the essence of a relation cannot 
be the same as the essence of its absolute foundation, neither 
oan the existence of a relation be really identified with the 
aot of existence of the foundation, though, as accidents, both 
-
al S. T., I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4. 
22 R6gis Jolivet, Traite de Philosophie, Emmanuel Vitte, Paris, 
1946, III, 298. 
23 C. G., IV, o. 14. 
24 johri of St. Thomas, I, 513 b 19.25. 
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will have an existence which is inesse. 
.. 
To deny this real distinction of relation and foundation 
is to equate the two. One must consequ·ently reduce the rela-
tion to an absolute, or make the foundation a relation. But 
since the foundation is the cause of a relation, it enjoys a 
priority of nature to the relation which is as an effect. 25 
So one would be forced to take the former alternative and make 
relation an absolute. If a r,elation is in any respect or to 
any degree an absolute, in that respect B.nd to that degree it 
ceases to be a relation. 
And even if the founds.tion were reduced to the relation, 
this would not help things; for as we mentioned above, no re-
lation can be founded upon a relation. If the foundation were 
a relation, it could not be the foundation of the relation. 
For, as Jolivet writes, 
II semble cependant que 1 'opinion affirma-
tive, c'est-A-dire distinguant reellement 
la relation d'avec son fondement, soit la 
plus plausible, car ell~ revient simple-
ment a constater cette evidence que si Ie 
fondement n'est pas uniquement absolu, 
c'est-a-dire une chose donnee en soi, mais 
aussi relatif, il ne peut l'etre que par 
une autre realite que celle qui le con-
stitue en l-g.i-meme. i:::6 
Suarez explicitly admits that the predicamental relation 
----_._--- --
25 
26 
S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opusculum de Ente et Essentia, ed. by 
Charles Boyer, S.J., apud Univ.-areg., Romae, 1933, c. 7. 
Jolivet, III, 298. 
» 
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is an absolute form, but an absolute form in so far as it con-
notes a term: 
.. 
••• esse in re formam absolutam, non tamen 
absolute sumptam, sed ut respicientem ali-
am, quam d~9ominatio relativa includit seu 
connotat. 
Therefore, the whole reality of predicamental relation as such 
would seem to consist precisely in this connotation of term. 
Suarez himself nowhere in his treatment of predicamental rela-
tion analyzco in detail this notion of connotation. But we can 
"ask him several questions, suggested by Father Rugon, which 
bring the point in full focus: 
Quid sit connotatio termini, transcenden-
talis an praedicamentalia? Quid sit etiam 
esse accidentale quod fundamento a~~itur, 
ali quid logicum an aliquid reale? 
Is this connotation of term a transcendental or a predica-
mental reference to a term? If it is transc~ndental, ariSing 
as a radical reference to a term, then the absolute foundation 
can never lose such a reference. It is obvious from many exam-
pIes which Suarez has granted, that the 8.bsolute foundation 
can exist without any real reference. Therefore, the connota-
tion cannot be transcendental. But even granting that it were 
transcendental, this transcendental connotation would not be a 
predicamental relation, that is, a relation which would consti-
tute a distinct predicament, a distinct classification of being. 
a7 Suarez, d. 47, so 2, n. 22. 
28 A. R. P. Eduardus Hugon, O. P., Cursus Philosophiae Thomis-
ticae, P. Leth1elleux, Parisiis, 1928. Vol. III, 590. 
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There would be no such thing as a predicamental relation. Suarez 
• 
nowhere even hints that he would be content with this alterna~ 
tive. In fact, he is emphatic in claiming that over and above 
transcendental relations, there exist relations which consti-
tute a distinct predicament. 29 
But if this connotation of term is not a transcendental 
reference, it must be predicamental. If it is predicamental, 
then we ask further what is this new accidental reference which 
is added to the absolute foundation. Is this new additional 
connotation something real or is it merely rational? If the 
connotation is something real, then Suarez must admit that it 
is a real addition and is really distinct from the foundation 
to which it is added. If the connotation is real and was not 
present to the foundation before the existence of the actual 
term, then that connotation must make a real composition with 
the foundation. 
It is clear that st. Thomas wanted a real composition of 
substance and relation: 
••• in aliis autem relationibus in crea-
turis existentibus, est aliud esse rela-
tionis et substantiae quae refertur, et 
ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum quod 
insunt compositionem faciunt ad subjec-
tum ••• 30 
This could be had through the composition of substance and foun-
29 Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 16. 
30 In I ~ent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. 
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dation, even though the relation were identified with that 
.. 
foundation. But one must remember that the foundation really 
pre-exists the actuality of relation; thus any new perfection 
will make real composition with both substance and foundation. 
Eut a real composition demands real components, really distinct. 
If this predicamental connotation is not real, but logical, 
then there are no such entities as real relations, but only ra-
tional relations which exist in an intellect considering those 
absolute foundations under a. relative aspect. But Suarez main-
tains throughout his discussion that predicamental relations 
are real. Their reality can only be maintained if one grants 
a real distinction between them and their foundations. 
Suarez seems to want the act of a.ccidental existence, in-
~, to be the guarantee of the reality of relations. In the 
course of the discussion in which he identifies the esse ad and 
the ~ ~n of a predicamental relation, he says that if a rela-
tion is to be real, then it must either exist in itself (en~ 
31 or in a subject (ens ~n alio). It is true that 
the act of existence is that by which the relation actually 
exists in the real order. But the real relation enjoys that 
actual existence only because the essence with a real priority 
of nature implied a real aptitude for such an existential act. 32 
31 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 24. 
32 John of st. Thomas, I, 512 b 26"31. 
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The reason why Suarez rejects the ~ ad-~ in distinc-
tion is beca1~se he rejects the real distinction between crea-
ture essence and existence. For, as Maquart writes, 
Item apparet quomodo, deficiente termino, 
cessat relation: "denominatio relativa in-
cludit aliquo modo terminum, sine quo non 
manet actualiter, sed fundamenta!!ter tan-
tum seu in proxima aptitudine." Sed 
haec tenere non potest nisi quia, propter 
negationem distinctionis realis inter es-
aentiam et esse, debet essentia realis re-
lationis sumi relate ad ease quod est in 
subjecto: unde sequitur relationem "esse 
in re formam aliguam absolutam ••• respici-
entem aliam" ••• 34 
For Suarez the essence and existence of any finite being 
are identified, distinct only in an intellect which separates 
the two elements: 
Dicendum ergo est, eamdem rem esse essen-
tiam et existentiam, concipi autem sub ra-
tione essentiae, quatenus ratione ejus con-
etituitur res sub tali genere et specie •••• 
At vero haec eadem res concipitur sub ra-
tione existentiae, quatenus est ratio es-
sendi in rerum natura et extra causas. 35 
Therefore, the essence of a predicamental relation as a real ac-
cident will also be identified with its act of existence. The 
whole essence of a relation as an order to something outside 
the subject will be really identified with the act of acciden-
tal existence which is an order to the subject of inherence. 
The foundation of a relation as an absolute accident is com-
33 Suarez, d. 47, s. ~, n. 23. 
34 Maquart, III-2, 186. 
35 Sllarez, d. 31, s. 6, n. 23. 
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pletely orientated to its substantive subject; for, as st. Thom-
as sa.ys, 
.. 
Si consideremus propriam rationem cujus~ 
libet generis, quodlibet aliorum generum, 
praeter ad aliquid, importat imperfectio-
nem; quantitas enim habet propriam ratio-
nem in comparatione ad subjectum; est 
enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qual-
itas dispositio sus~tantiae, et sic patet 
in omnibus aliis. 
Therefore, if Suarez identifies the order to a term which 
is the essence of a relation with the order to the subject which 
is the existence of an accidental relation, then it is not dif-
ficult to understand how he can hold that the entire relation, 
essence and existence are identified with the foundation which 
likewise implies a reference to its subject. 
esse ad terminum : ~ in subjecto. 
But the foundation totally : ~ in subjecto. 
Therefore, ~ ad termin~~ : the foundation. 
To push the question back still further, the ultimate basis 
for Suarez's denial of the real distinction.between creature es-
sence and existence is his concept of being. 
_._ .. _---
Fundamentum distinctionis rationis inter 
essentiam et esse ••• est essentia prout 
pra.escindit ab actuali existentia, quae 
proinde nec essentia actualis, nec pos-
sibIlis. 37 
36 In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3. 
37 Maquart, IIIM2, 89. 
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Suarez in forming the concept of being forms a concept 
• 
which represents all individual beings under a certain unity 
which they possess. It represents all the inferiors which veri-
fy being precisely in so far as they agree in being~ in so far 
as they are similar: 
Necesse est conceptum formalem entis habere 
aliquod aggregatum objectum; ••• ergo opor-
tat ut ille conceptus sit unus secundum ali-
quam convenientiam et similitudinem entium 
inter see :58 
••• omnia entia realia vere habent aliquam 
similitudinem et convenientiam in ratione 
essendi; ergo possunt concipi et reprae-
sentari sub ea praecisa ratione qua inter 
se conveniunt; ergo possunt sub ea ratio-
ne unum conceptum objectivum constltuere; 
ergo ille est conceptus objectivus entis. 39 
Although the individual beings really differ in the real order, 
the Suarezian concept of being does not include the essential 
modes or differences of the inferiors. 
conceptus entis objectivus praecisus est 
ab omni ratione particulario Dico secun-
do: hic conceptus objectivus est secun-
dum rationem praecisu8 ab omnibus particu-
laribus, seu membris dividentibus ens, 
etiam si sint maxime simplices entitates. 
Haec conclusio videtur mihi necessaria ••• 
quia, cum omnia entia determinata ali quo-
modo dividentia ens sint inter se dis-
tincta, et plura objective, non possunt 
intelligi convenire in unum objectivum 
conceptum, nisi saltem secundum rationem 
fiat praecisio et abstractio a propri!8 
rationibus, in quibus distinguuntur. 
Thus the concept of being in abstracting from the differen-
--------38 Suarez, d. 2~ s. 2, n. 8. 
39 Ibid., n. 14. 
40 IbId., n. 15. 
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tiating modes of the inferiors, includes neither the modes of 
substance nor of accident. 
Ex his infero primo, in hoc conceptu en-
tis objectivo et sic praeciso, non inclu-
di actu modos intrinsecos substantiae, 4 
vel aliorum membrorum quae dividunt ens. 1 
Since the concept of being does not include the e~sential modes 
of differences within its comprehen3ion, neither does it in-
elude the inferiors themselves, for the differences as essential 
modes, are the entity of the inferiors. If the modes are con-
tained within being only potentially, not actually, 42 then 
one can likewise conclude that the inferiors of being are con-
tained within the concept of being only in potency. This al-
lows Suarez to make the statement: 
'Cum autem negatur esse de essentia crea-
turae actu existere sumenda est creatura 
ut abstrahit seu praescindit a creatura 
creata et creabili, cujus essentia objec-
tive concepts abstrahit ab actuali esse 
aut entitate, et hoc modo negatur esse 
de essentia ejus actu exi.stere, quia non 
clauditur 42 conceptu ejus essentiali sic 
praeciso. 
The radical reason for this de-existentializing method in 
treating the concept of being is that Suarez throughout his dis-
cussion of being remains entirely within the first operation of 
the mind, the simple apprehension. He does not go on to know 
real existence in the judgment, the real existence which dyna-
41 Ibid., n. 21. 
42~ Ibid. 
43 !bid., d. 31, s. 6, n. 24. 
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mizes the concept of being itself. 44 
• 
Precisely because of this essentialist approach to being,45 
Suarez does not hold the real distinction between creature es-
sence and existence. Because of his stand on finite essence 
and existence, he holds the real identification of relation and 
foundation, reducing both in the last analysis to an absolute. 
A real distinction between a relation and its foundation, 
however, does not make relation in any wayan absolute. In 
fact, as we have just seen, to take the opposite course and to 
identify the two, is to reduce relation to an absolute. But re-
lation is distinct froIn any and every absolute. 46 It consti-
tutes a distinct category of being, 47 whose whole essence is 
a pure reference to a term. 48 Nor can predicamental relations 
ever be hypostatized so as to exist in themselves. 49 By their 
act of existence they inhere immediately in a subject, modify 
that subject, relate it to something else. 50 Nor, as Suarez 
pointed out, as relations can never exist in themselves separat-
ed from their proximate subject of inherence, can they ever be 
~ / ~ 44 Andre Marc, S.J., L'Idee de l'etre, Gabriel Beauchesne et ses 
Fils, Paris, 1933, lOl-lO~ 
45 Etienne Gilson, On Essence and Existence, lecture 12, from 
short-hand notes-raken during an unpublished series of lec-
tures given at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
Toronoo, from March 8, 1946 to April 25, 1946. 
46 ~UOdl., IX, 4. 
47n V Meta., lect. 9, n. 889-894. 
48 s: T:, I, q. 28, a. 1. 
49 Suarez, d. 47, s. 5, n. 12. 
50 C. G., IV, c. 14. 
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the proper effect of any .efficiency. 51 As every principle is 
• 
of itself an absolute, 52 so every cause is of itself an ab-
solute. 53 As every cause is of itself an absolute, so every 
proper effect is of itself an absolute. 54 But when the agent' 
causality terminates at an effect, if the proper conditions are 
had, a relation will result. 55 Although there are many diffi-
culties arising out of this notion of resultancy, !esultantia,56 
a thousand difficulties do not make a doubt. Resultancy is ad-
mitted by all the scholastics in the case of the origin of quan-
tity and quality from a substance. 57 
Thus, in brief, the Suarezian position on predicamental re-
lation, focused on the rational distinction between relation 
and foundation, seems to destroy both the reality and the rela-
tivity of the relations. But in closing our brief study of 
Suarez's position on this question, we can add a word of quali-
fied commendation. Throughout his distinction of relation, 
Suarez was manfully combating the radical Nominalism of his 
day by insisting on the extra-mental reality of relations. This 
fact he admitted and asserted with brilliant vigour. If his 
explanation of this fact seems in the last analysis incorrect 
51 Suarez, d. 47, s. 6, n. 1. 
52 S. T., I, q. 41, a. 5. 
53 Ibid., I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1. 
54 Ibid., I, q. 43, a. 3. 
55 John of st. Thomas, I, 595 a 20. 
56 Ibid., 590-595. 
57 Ibid., I, 461 a 30. 
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and even inconsistent with his initial premise of the reality 
.. 
of relations, let us not condemn him too harshly or too hastily. 
Let us remember that even now, centuries later, scholastics, 
and even Thomists, are still quite divided in their interpreta-
tion of the intimate nature of this most elusive of beings. 
But Suarez's final position fails to do justice to the evidence 
as we see it. His intentions were correct: to justify real 
relations; his explanation, however, seems to destroy the very 
thing he set out to justify. As we see the problem, the only 
way to explain real relations, to keep them real and to keep 
them relations; to keep them a distinct predicament, is to 
place a real distinction between the relation and its founda-
tion. 
.. 
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